uman Rights Code provides an example of an attempt to redress quasi-social harms. It may be true that tort law is unable to address the "social injury that occurs at a personal level", but this is exactly the kind of injury the human rights codes of the country have been enacted to redress. While couched in the terminology of individual human rights, the OHRC's categories of protection indicate a necessary connection to the notion of a social harm. The OHRC does not promise equality, equal treatment, equal respect etc. of every person, its grandiose preamble notwithstanding. What it promises is that injurious discrimination to individuals due to membership in certain social categories will be redressed by damages or injunction. These social categories are those which are traditionally associated with social injury - race, ancestry, place of origin, colour, ethnic origin, citizenship, creed, sex, sexual orientation, age, marital or family status, or handicap. Notice that many categories are absent - foolhardiness, poverty, language group, education, etc. What this indicates is that the OHRC does not address an equality right per se, but addresses social harm as a result of being eg. black, female, Croatian, gay, blind, 25 yr. old, unmarried, etc. The remedies under s.40 of the OHRC are nearly identical to those in the modified ordinance - damages, including those for personal anguish, costs of the action, and injunction. The modified ordinance would thus be quite similar to the existing human rights legislation in Ontario in its recognition of social harm and its suggestion of remedies. Where it would differ is in its refusal to supplant the power of the victim to pursue their own action in court, rather than deal with a commission (and its discretionary powers) or board of inquiry to investigate matters. Thus the modified ordinance would remain "women-initiated and women-driven." It would also differ from the OHRC in...
