exception of that, one must assume that President Reagan and his administration did succeed at his goal of deregulation of the market. He just finished where Carter left off. The foregoing interpretations and President Ronald Reagan’s effort to manipulate the economy drew many different conclusions on his success and or failure from many politicians, economists, and the general public. Political economist Roger Kormendi makes a serious defense of Reagan “heaven”. He analyzed that … “high real interest rates, large current account deficits, and even large budget deficits are not necessarily fundamental problems hanging over our economy, a legacy of chaos from the Reagan era. Rather, when viewed as a whole, they are natural consequences of expectations of an improved future” (256-257). High interest rates were only a reflection of rebirth in the American economy. Foreign investment, specifically from Japan, revealed that the international community was showing confidence in the U.S. economy. Kormendi also posits that the budget deficit is not a problem in a rapidly growing economy if Morris 13government spending is restrained. This is where “hell” theorists have a fight. Reagan did overspend by running large foreign account deficits while waiting for his supply-side theory to come around, which it did not (Kormendi 251). Reagan supporters claim success in reducing the rate of spending, but this decline is measured from the GNP peak in Reagan’s administration in 1983, whereas it should be measured from when Reagan assumed office, which generated a growth in spending. Deregulation was successful in part, but even a member of Reagan’s Council of Economic Advisors, Thomas Moore, was disappointed that financial markets were not deregulated more. He felt Reagan promised more than he was able to provide. Reagan’s management of the labor supply was widely successful, ...
