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Further biological research on the effect of psychological trauma on the neurochemistry of memory may help clinicians distinguish between true repressed memories and false memories in clients who report abuse. However, to date there is no method to determine the accuracy of these memories. Therefore clinicians and the courts must rely on corroborative evidence, and behavioral and physiologic clues to distinguish veracity. Recently there has been an extreme debate between “false” vs. “repressed” memories of abuse. A false memory is created when an event that really happened becomes confused with images produced by trying to remember an imagined event. The term false memory syndrome refers to the notion that illusionary and untrue memories of earlier child abuse can be ‘recalled’ by adult clients during therapy. In an increasingly polarized and emotive debate, extreme positions have been adopted, on one side by those believing that recovered memories nearly always represent actual traumatic experiences, for example, Fredrickson (1992) who argues for a ‘repressed memory syndrome’ and, on the other side, by those describing a growing epidemic of false memories of abuse which did not occur. (Gardner, 1992; Loftus, 1993; Ofshe & Watters, 1993; Yapko, 1994). Recovery of repressed memories that lead to accusations of child molesting and other abuses are increasing, but skeptics believe people are creating false memories. Neurobiological studies show that both suppression and recall and the creation of false memories are possible. (Kandel, 1994) In this paper both sides of the debate will be analyzed and evaluated. The issue of ‘false’ vs. ‘repressed’ memories is of increasing relevance to counseling psychologists and indeed to any professional involved in therapy. The reputation of therapy is at stake, as clients begin to sue therapists for the implantation of false memories. In turn, it is essential that all clinicians conduct their therapy according to the latest guidelines of practice as to avoid suggestion and the possible implantation of false memories. The need for understanding the phenomenon of repressed memories is also very important from a legal standpoint. In recent years there has been numerous cases of people suing their parents or other authority figures for abuse that has been recalled many years after the abuse was said to have occurred. The rulings in these cases have often been controversial considering there is often not enough concrete or collaborative evidence to prove the accused to be guilty or innocent. The judge and jury are often forced to make a ruling that relies heavily on the testimonial of the accuser. This is very contentious considering there is not an accurate and reliable test to determine the validity of the accuser. The importance of understanding the underlying psychological mechanisms by which both memories are repressed and recovered, and are falsely created has great implications clinically and legally for our society. Hopefully future research will help close the gap between the distance sides of the debate. The general findings associated with the repressed memory debate has lead to strong evidence both in favor of repressed memories and also in favor of recalling false memories. Proponents of genuine recovered memory have cited a wealth of studies documenting that people that have been sexually abused as children have, at some time, forgotten the experience. However, the weakness of many such studies is their reliance on uncorroborated, retrospective data (Lindsay & Read, 1994). Attempts have been made to address these criticisms. Widow & Morris (1993), in a longitudinal study, found a substantial proportion of a sample of documented child abuse cases to fail to recall the abuse at a follow-up. In an attempt to overcome the methodological weakness of a lack of external corroboration of abuse, Williams (1995) interviewed a sample of women whose earlier child abuse was well-documented in medical records. She found that 38 percent of 129 women with documented abuse histories did not recall the abuse on re-interview 17 years later. Of those recounting the abuse, 47 percent claimed that there had been a time when they had not remembered the abuse. Unlike most other retrospective studies, Williams’ study provides clear corroborative evidence that the abuse did occur. The shortcomings of the study, however, is that it relies on subjects retrospective reports of the forgetting of the abuse. It is unclear how reliable the individuals’ retrospective reports that they had not remembered the event for a period are, and there may be alternative reasons for those not recalling at the time of the interview. Failure to recount the memory does not imply forgetting, and may instead reflect the deliberate avoidance of painful recollections (Ceci & Loftus, 1994). This raises two main issues; firstly, the extent to which it is possible to determine between forgetting and underreporting of abuse and secondly, the extent to which it may or may not be helpful to remind individuals of painful memories which they may have good reason to wish to forget (Farrants, 1998) In order to support the notion that some individuals may forget, rather than simply not report, an experience of a abuse for a period of time, the proponents of recovered memory have outlined the mechanisms which may account for such forgetting, including repression, dissociation, and childhood amnesia (Lindsay & Read, 1994). Some clinical psychologists believe that children can learn to block memories as a survival mechanism: if physical escape from their tormentor is not possible, psychological escape may become crucial. When children can’t avoid abuse and know it is going to be repeated, some cope by tuning out- mentally dissociating themselves from the abuse while it is occurring- or by repressing the memory afterward (Kandel, 1994) However, there are many problems with such concepts. Such explanations of forgetting tend to be descriptive of the fact that traumatic events may be forgotten rather than explanatory of the way in which this occurs. Understanding of memory mechanisms generally tends to be theoretical and the mechanisms that underpin observable memory phenomena are arguably mere constructions, accounting for what is observed rather than a factual account of what is know about the way in which memory operates (Farrants, 1998). Other proponents of ‘repressed memory syndrome’ have explored the biological aspects of memory in searching for answers. Bruce Perry, a professor of child psychiatry, says that the way memories are laid down can differ as different brain regions are activated. When an individuals mental state moves along a continuum from calm to vigilance, memory is best. As the mental state moves further on to alarm, fear, and finally terror, brain regions associated with cognition all but shut off. “The way information is stored is a function of what part of the brain is on, and the way it get recalled is also a function of what part of the brain is on, ”says Perry. Memory formation is also influenced by the biochemistry of the stress response. The chronic severe stress that occurs with long-term abuse seems particular able to impair activity in the hippocampal region thought to be critical in learning and memory (Sapolsky, 1994). Stress stimulates the release of glucocorticoids, which at chronically high levels can decrease the ability of neurons to take up glucose and function properly for the formation and recall of memory. In working with rats, Michela Gallagher (1999) has found that implicit memories of fearful experiences are strengthened when noradrenaline a neurotransmitter associated with alertness and stress is released in the amygdala. He has also found that under extreme stress rats release a naturally occurring opium-like substance called endogenous opiates that weaken memory storage. This finding suggests a fascinating possibility. If an incident is so distressing that the brain makes opiates to dull the pain, the opiates may interfere with the memory storing process. Gallagher has also found using a drug called nalaxone to block endogenous opiates at the time of consolidation does enhance memory recall in rats. These studies suggest there may be a biological mechanism through which memories are suppressed in humans, but there arises the question of how these memories are retrieved. Some researchers have speculated that a memory can be stored weakly in the explicit system because endogenous opiates interfered with its consolidation- so weakly the person has no conscious memory of the original wrenching event. That same event, though, might also be captured by the implicit system through a characteristic, physical sensation, or gesture. Perhaps later the implicit system may provide clues, such as physical sensations, that help stir the recall of the weak explicit memory (Kandel, 1994). The fact that many people who say they were abused as children often describe their memories coming back as bodily sensations relates well with this theory. Some survivors of abuse describe their recovered memories as qualitatively different from other memories. They feel as if they are actually experiencing the event, with all its textures, smells, and physical sensations. This parallels the intensity of flashbacks experienced by combat veterans. Gallagher has found that implicit memory could be strengthened by stimulating noradrenaline in the amygdala, and studies at Yale have suggested that noradrenaline released in response to stress contributes to the powerful flashbacks of Vietnam veterans (Kandel, 1994). Perhaps memories that sexual abuse survivors are normally unable to access are retrieved when their noradrenaline system is activated. All this suggests that the action of endogenous opiates and noradrenaline in the amygdala and hippocampus could begin to provide a biological framework for examining how memories are repressed and later retrieved. It may soon be feasible to examine these ideas directly. Improvements in brain imaging may eventually let scientist examine even small structures in the brain in a safe, noninvasive way. We may then be able to see whether sexual abuse leads to physical changes in the amygdala that reflect a persons’ memories of the event and whether these changes can be modulated by the noradrenergic and opioid systems (Kandel, 1994). Despite this evidence, there is a strong debate that repressed memories may not occur. Opponents to this idea often present the evidence of false memories. Proponents of false memory syndrome have utilized the findings from laboratory studies of the suggestibility of memory to support their stance. A long history of research on human memory documents the extent to which misleading suggestions can distort the recall of events (Lindsay & Read, 1994). In a classic study, Loftus (1993) led five subjects to believe over a period, with the use of misleading and suggestive questioning, that they had been lost in a shopping mall as a child. Loftus concluded that it is indeed possible to implant false memories, which can be as vivid, internally coherent, and detailed as true memories. Loftus coined this phenomenon ‘misinformation effect’ (Farrants, 1998). It has been argued that such findings reveal nothing helpful to the understanding of memories of abuse (Pedzdek, 1994). Firstly, in Loftus’ study, the memories were implanted by a relative, who may be assumed by the subject to have personal knowledge of the event, thus giving it credence. Secondly it could be argued that individuals may be operating according to a pre-existing script for common events such as being lost while shopping, rendering such a memory easy to construct. Pezdeck (1994) argues that individuals, especially children, are unlikely to posses such a script for sexual abuse, unless it is something which they have directly experienced. However Pezdek’s point fails to recognize that most adults in this present culture may in fact posses such a script. Furthermore, Holst and Pezdek (1992) found that subjects shared common scripts for three types of robberies, which affected their memory of events, despite no direct experience of them. These studies, therefore, suggest that personal experience of sexual abuse is not essential for the recovery of such memories, as the possibility remains existing scripts are being deployed (Farrants, 1998). Generalizing from the Loftus study to other situations heeds caution. The study has been criticized for numerous flaws including the nature of her sample, the possible effects of social influence on response and the inappropriate generalization of data from non-traumatized laboratory subjects to traumatized individuals. The research findings are, therefore, mixed with some evidence for the fact that misleading or suggestive questioning can result in memory distortion, although the extent to which entirely new memories of traumatic incidences can be created from nothing has not yet been demonstrated. False memory proponents have argued that it is indeed the way in which therapist operates that lead the client to recover false memories. Indeed, it has been reported that over two-thirds of people who have alleged abuse stated that their first suspicion that abuse had occurred arose during a therapy session (Roe et al., 1994). Therefore it is necessary to examine the evidence that pseudomemories have been recovered during therapy. In a critique of the article of Lindsay and Read (1994) outlining the risk of false memories being created in therapy, Pezdek (1994) argues that evidence for therapist-implanted memory is weak. Lindsay and Read (1994) have been criticized for asserting the possibility that false memories can be created while providing no evidence for the phenomenon (Pezdek, 1994). As Pezdek reflects, `it is illogical to infer the existence of a phenomenon from the possibility of explaining it'. In order to support the view that it is possible for pseudomemories to be created, Read and Lindsay (1994) cite examples of bizarre and unlikely memories which have been recovered during therapy, some of which were in press at the time of Lindsay and Read's article. For example, Bass and Davis (1988) write of recovered memories of entire cities of satanic ritual abusers. Another account described a woman who recalled giving birth at the age of eight, and Loftus et al. (1994) writes of therapist-aided memories of life in the womb, the bizarre nature of which lead Read and Lindsay to conclude them to be highly unlikely to be true. They also refer to reports of a therapist-assisted memory of molestation by a man who was later found to have been out of the country at the time. Far from regarding this fact as evidence that the abuse did not occur, the client reported that she must, therefore, have been abused by a different man. While this example does not in any way prove that abuse did not occur, it does provide an example of a client altering the story to fit the facts and grants some credence to the notion that it is possible to recall events inaccurately. Ceci and Loftus (1994) cite the example of Laura Pasley, who sued her therapist for incompetence, having recovered memories which Laura later retracted, believing them to be false. Unfortunately, is it not clear whether Laura had any corroborating evidence that the abuse did not occur, and so this cannot be regarded as evidence of false recall. In fact is it almost impossible to prove that abuse did not occur, with the retraction of earlier statements alone constituting insufficient evidence (Pezdek, 1994). Read and Lindsay (1994) conclude that even their critics now concede that false memories can be implanted by therapists, and maintain that the debate has shifted from the possibility of therapy-induced false beliefs to their prevalence. The specific attitudes and behavior of therapists has been cited by false memory proponents as a factor contributing to this (Farrants, 1998). Watkins (1995) states that certainly part of the controversy today is the fault of overeager therapists who have too suggestively championed the possibility of child abuse. Some have blamed poorly trained therapists for inadvertently implanting false memories of abuse in their clients, or therapists who practice without an understanding of psychological theories of normal memory. However, it is not only the inexperienced and incompetent who are accused of eliciting false memories during therapy. Scotford (1994), the director of the British False Memory Society (BFMS), claims that, while therapists `palm off blame' onto poorly trained hypnotherapists, in fact the BFMS also receives complaints about fully trained professionals such as psychiatrists and psychologists. Ceci and Loftus (1994) state that even eminent, experienced therapists use techniques likely to create false memories. Similarly, Rogers (1995) found a significant number of doctoral therapists to regularly apply methods involving leading suggestions which may have potential risk. An Andrews et al. (1995) survey of the beliefs of British Psychological Society (BPS) practitioners revealed that many psychologists believe their clients' reports of ritual satanic abuse, despite the La Fontaine report (1994), which found no evidence of satanic abuse and despite any lack of police or other corroborative evidence for the practice. In addition more than 90 percent of those reporting such ritual abuse first “uncovered” the memories during dreams or hypnosis, mental states that are fertile ground for the formation of false memories. It has been argued, therefore, that recovery of false memories is a function of suggestive probing by the therapist or the influence of popular culture (Lindsay & Read, 1994). However, such claims are not supported by any systematic, empirical or ecologically valid evidence (Berliner & Williams, 1994). Indeed Elliott (1994), found only 15 per cent of subjects recalling abuse to have done so during psychotherapy, contrary to the figure of two-thirds from Roe et al. (1994), suggesting that more often than not factors other than therapy or the therapist are triggering the recall (Farrants, 1998). False memory proponents ignore the fact that there is a standard of care in psychotherapy literature, and unfairly deploy selective references to anecdotal accounts of bad practice to support their stance (Brown, 1995). The suggestion that therapists deliberately plant false memories has been criticized by McKissack (1996) on the basis that, if false memories are created by unscrupulous therapists, their motives would be, at the least, puzzling (Withers & Mitchell, 1995). Indeed, most professionally trained therapists are aware of the dangers. The fact that the BPS have issued guidelines to help prevent the creation of false memories in therapy is an indication of the awareness within the psychology profession of such risks (BPS, 1995). While the BPS guidelines suggest ways in which practitioners can minimize the risk of false memory production, it has been argued that it is the nature of certain memory recovery therapies, for example hypnosis, rather than specific therapist interactions, which may inadvertently lead some adults to construct illusory memories (Lindsay & Read, 1994). However, there is, as yet, no evidence that any particular therapeutic approach may produce false memories (Mollon, 1996). Indeed, recent research suggests that it is the hypnotizability of subjects rather than hypnosis per se which is a factor in false recall (Brown, 1995). Recovered memory is not limited to sexual abuse, or to the therapeutic context, or to untrained therapists, and is a robust and frequent phenomenon (Andrews et al., 1995), and so neither therapists nor therapies can take the full responsibility for the recovery of such memories. One concern of those who argue against the concept of false memory is that genuine survivors of sexual abuse may not be taken seriously, and so may not receive adequate help. This highlights the fact that, throughout the debate, there has been an assumption that all those who have genuinely suffered from abuse should be made aware of the fact and receive some form of therapy. However, several authors have questioned the therapeutic value of uncovering events, even if they genuinely did occur, and of the extent to which a past experience of abuse can lead to present-day symptoms. The belief of some therapists that all symptoms have trauma as their primary etiology may be a possible factor that can lead to false recall (Brown, 1995). Berliner and Williams (1994) state that `some therapists make the mistake of attributing far too many current problems to a sexual abuse history' and that `the importance of the factor of sexual experience in the causation of disease has been greatly over-estimated by Freud' (Moll, 1913). It is well documented that people who have experienced trauma do not all react in the same way; for example, not everyone who experiences a traumatic event develops PTSD symptoms. Perhaps it is because child sexual abuse is considered so abhorrent that it is difficult for therapists to accept that individuals can survive abuse without developing psychological problems. This may also be a function of the fact that therapists may only see those survivors who have developed psychological problems and have little experience of those who do not develop symptoms, as they do not present for therapy (Farrants, 1998). If not all abuse leads to symptoms, it could be argued that not all those abused require therapy. It is possible that defenses such as denial, repression or dissociation may have enabled some survivors to continue to function without developing pathological symptoms. If this is the case, it may be useful to leave these defenses intact, rather than to assume that such defenses are always more damaging to the individual than the uncovering of the trauma. Ceci and Loftus (1994) argue that if unconscious past memories lead to symptoms, one may be consciously dwelling on them. Campbell (1995) blames `New Age ideology that insight into symptoms leads to their alleviation, and that a relentless search for "confirmatory" imagery is therapeutic'. The possibility has been raised that an approach dealing with past trauma may detract from other important therapeutic issues (Haaken & Schlaps, 1991). Spiegal (1994) found no difference in the outcomes between treatments involving dealing with current symptoms and those involving working on past experiences. For this reason, Ceci and Loftus (1994) ask whether it is worth the risk of using memory recovery methods until the base rates for false recall are known; however, it is unlikely that this can ever be known for certain, given the frequent lack of external corroboration and the fact that false and true memories are indistinguishable in their nature (Lindsay & Read, 1994). The fact remains that the actual number of those adults who have been sexually abused as children is unknown, as is the number of those who have developed psychological symptoms as a result. It is, therefore, important not to assume that memory recovery therapies always provide the most beneficial approach, regardless of one's stance on whether such memories are accurate or not, particularly in view of the resulting upheaval in family systems when abuse, either accurately or inaccurately is recovered (Farrant, 1998). Although science is starting to shed some light on the bitter debate over “false” vs. “repressed” memories, one side has yet to claim victory. There is evidence that supports both that memories can be repressed and later recovered and that memories can be implanted and fabricated. In evaluating this topic I feel a diathesis is needed. I feel this debate will never be settled with an absolute “winner” and “loser”. I feel that “repressed memory syndrome” is a separate phenomenon from “false memory syndrome” and that both occur at significant rates in our population. I feel when clinicians are working with patients who report repressed memories of abuse coming back, they should evaluate the information on an individual case basis. Ideally, one wants to see independent evidence to corroborate the putative victim’s report, for example, testimony from family members, diaries, photographs, medical and police records. Unfortunately, given the private nature of child abuse and the treats made to children to prevent them from telling others, independent evidence often isn’t available. I feel clinicians have a responsibility to examine the evidence they are presented very carefully. They need to be especially suspicious of memories that spring from hypnosis, dreams, or flashbacks. They should also be leery of patients who hesitate to give permission to search for outside corroboration. Those who are not telling the truth tend to be very resistant to gathering collateral information. Also clients who tend to want to talk about the abuse much more readily and do not show the terror and avoidance of discussing the abuse should be examined more carefully. I also think that more attention should be paid to internal evidence. It has been documented in verified cases of abuse that certain physiologic arousal symptoms are present when the client discusses the abuse. Heart rate, blood pressure, and skin conductance all increase when a person with documented abuse receives cues related to their trauma. It has been hypothesized that those clients that create false memories, although they believe their memories to be true, do not experience the same physiological symptoms when given cues of their alleged traumas. I feel that considerable future research is needed on this topic. I feel that research in determining false memories from repressed memories is pertinent. I feel researchers should focus on biological aspects of memory, considering that running experiments with the cognitive aspects of memories is, for the most part, unethical. It would be ideal for these researchers to be able to determine if they could implant memories of sexual abuse into participants in a study, but the ethics board would never allow it. I feel it is necessary to research the relationship between physiological arousal and documented proof of abuse. I think that this might have great implications in determining the validity of certain cases. I also think it is necessary to study the neurotransmitters associated with memories and the stress response, in determining mechanisms through which memories can be repressed or created. I also feel more research is necessary in the area of imagination as related to perception. Although both use the same brain architecture, they are represented differently in our awareness. I am curious to know what occurs when an imagined event gets mistaken for a perceived event, and if there is a way to determine if this is indeed what has happened in people who have created false memories of abuse. I feel that continued research on this topic is especially important considering the growing number of lawsuits between the accuser and the accused, and the client and clinician. The outcomes of these suits have critical implications both for the legal system and therapeutic community. The contrasting research findings, far from favoring one side of the debate, in fact provide some evidence to support both stances. In light of the evidence of the fallibility and suggestibility of memory, it is conceivable that there are occasions when individuals develop false memories of childhood sexual abuse. However, the evidence suggesting that it is also possible to forget and later recall sexual abuse indicates that recovered memory for real events is also a genuine phenomenon. It is, therefore, possible to incorporate both positions, as the two stances are not mutually exclusive. The extreme positions adopted are, therefore, not tenable and to claim that either false memories are never created or that genuine abuse is never forgotten cannot be justified in view of the evidence. A more rational position, which I am choosing to commit to, is to accept that both may be possible. The reality is that child sexual abuse does occur in all too many cases, and helping the victims recover from their experiences should be the primary goal of all involved in these cases. In conclusion, the debate between “repressed” vs. “false” memories will continue, until both sides of the controversy realize that there is solid evidence for both phenomenon. My hope for the future is that both sides of the debate can possibly work in conjunction to help clinicians and law personal in determining the veracity of the accounts of repressed memories. Bibliography: References 1. Anastasi, J. S., Burns, C.M. (2000, September) Distinguishing between memory illusions and actual memories using phenomenological measurement and explicit warnings. The American Journal of Psychology. Retrieved September 14, 2000 from ProQuest database (Bell & Howell Information and Learning-ProQuest) on the World Wide Web: http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb 2. Cunningham, S., Garry, M. (2000, July) Remembering true and false traumatic experiences. USA Today. Retrieved September 14, 2000 from ProQuest database (Bell & Howell Information and Learning-ProQuest) on the World Wide Web: http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb 3. Kandel, E. (1994, May) Flights of Memory. Discover.15, 32-36 4. Kowalski, M.(1998, December). Applying the “two schools of thought” doctrine to the repressed memory controversy. The Journal of Legal Medicine. Retrieved September 14, 2000 from Lexis-Nexis database (Academic Universe) on the World Wide Web: http://www.lexis-nexis.com/universe 5. Farrants, J. (1998, September). The ‘false’ memory debate. Counseling Psychology Quarterly. Retrieved September 14, 2000 from ProQuest database (Bell & Howell Information and Learning-ProQuest) on the World Wide Web: http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb 6. Pezdeck, J., (1994). Making up memories? Memory & Cognition, 34(l), 35-47 7. Sapolsky, R. M., (1994) Why Zebra Don’t Get Ulcers. New York: W.H. Freeman and Company Word Count: 4609
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