Christianity, too, is a myth. Although there are any popular perceptions of faith, Tillich goes beyond all of this, saying that the popular perceptions, even by Christian religious traditions, are misconceptions. We often talk about having faith that there is life on another planet or something. To Tillich, these things do not constitute faith, but belief. The difference is that faith is ultimate concern. Faith must include both a cognitive and emotional component. Thus, it is impossible to have faith in something without it being your ultimate concern. What is not completely clear from Tillich is whether all people have some ultimate concern. It is clear that to some people it is their nation, to others success, and to some a God. But do people exist that are not ultimately concerned with anything? Isn’t it possible to mildly concerned with lot of different things, be they spiritual or economic? Tillich’s theory may be appealing to intellectuals who have rejected Freud because they still want to believe. He first states that the cognitive component must be present in any faith, which would appeal to anyone who has been turned off by religion because it seems to rely too much on emotion. Even James, an intellectual himself, put more emphasis on feelings than on thinking. The only path for intellectuals has been Freud’s science. In addition to adding the cognitive element, Tillich also openly encourages doubt in faith and even states that it is a necessary component in faith. According to Tillich, freedom is the possibility of having centered acts (faith). Because of the dynamics of faith, it is natural to be certain of the existence of ultimacy but not of its content. That nicely explains the existence of so many different religious traditions, all attempting to explain the ultimate concern. This doubt is not to be scientific or skeptical doubt, but rather existential doubt that is awareness of insecurit...
