of power as a result of greater structural board independence from management may prompt CEOs to initiate specific interpersonal influence attempts, such as ingratiating and persuasion toward board members. CEOs may be especially prone to such behavior because of their high intrinsic power motivation. In addition, the ambiguity and uncertainty inherent in CEOs performance provides ample opportunities for interpersonal influence. These factors may reinforce a more basic, psychological response to the threat of losing control. Frequently CEO/chairman duality reduces the ability or willingness of outside directors to challenge the CEO. Comparatively, when CEOs are deprived of official administration over affairs as the chairman, they lose their command over the agenda of the board .IVQualifying factors affecting CEO DualitySpecial factors affecting CEO duality include informal CEO power, and board vigilance. A CEOs source of informal power does not necessarily depend upon his position. Informal power can be acquired through reputation, prestigious contacts or affiliations with other companies . CEO duality can often reflect informal CEO power. Pfeffer(1978) argued that centralized structures such as CEO duality is more likely to arise when informal power is concentrated in a CEO. Board vigilance depicts a powerful board that has a strong influence on the company. There exist two types of powerful boards, they either share leadership with or command power over the CEO. Board vigilance combines those two categories into one characterized by high board power irrespective of the relationship with the CEO . CEOs often consider powerful boards to be supportive and encouraging of their efforts. A powerful board will, however, step in when the firm's strategy falters. Powerful boards have greater expertise, more awareness of their responsibilities, and more efficient internal processes than do weak boards (Pearce & Zahra, 1991). VConclusionIn con...
