terns of class ascendancy repeat themselves. While the bourgeois were nearly in full economic power by the time they gained political power, the proletariat will gain political power before they gain economic power by abolishing private property. It is not clear how Marx would deal with this disanalogy, considering that the only concrete evidence Marx cites of a class revolution is the bourgeois revolution. Challenging Marx's interpretation of that instance could completely undermine his claims to empiricism. Also, why should it be that economics should be the sole determinate of class? While economics may seem central to our self-conception, it does not seem at all obvious that an economic leveling will eliminate our propensity for dividing into antagonistic 'us'/'them' binarisms. Religion, ethnicity, race, gender, and sexuality: these are the heart of much conflict in our contemporary world. Arguing that all of these can be reduced to a conflict between economic classes does not seem to do justice to the importance of these characteristics in our lives. Marx's closes this chapter by famously remarking, "In place of the old bourgeois society, with its classes and class antagonisms, we shall have an association, in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all" (105). Now for many egalitarian-minded bourgeoisie, such an association sounds like a noble goal even if one doesn't agree with the communist means to its attainment. There are those, however, for whom this is not such a worthwhile goal. Friedrich Nietzsche is perhaps this most famous opponent of such social leveling. For Nietzsche humanity is measured by its greatest exemplars rather than by its average well being or the condition of its lowest members. If greatness can only be cultivated at the expense of the exploitation of the masses, so be it. A level society reduces us to the lowest common denominator and precludes the achievement of gr...
