the world and that this transferred easily to the military. Only the U.S. boasted a fleet of nuclear-powered mega carries. Only the U.S. possessed long-range strategic bombers. American jets and submarines were unchallenged as the finest in the world. Given American economic might, her military leaders had no doubt that the United States would simply grind down and wear out opponents in a drawn-out conventional war.As applied to Vietnam, these assumptions were transformed from beneficial guide points of sound policy to dogmatic assertions that precluded American leaders from carrying out a strategy suited to the unique situation of Vietnam.Following World War II, France and her nationalist leader, Charles de Gaulle, was eager to regain control of her overseas colonies. This applied particularly to Vietnam. (Which had been taken over by the Japanese during the war) This was the first dilemma faced by American leadership. Roosevelt loathes de Gaulle and felt that a return to the status quo ante-bellum was unacceptable. However, as the prospect of a struggle with the Soviet Union began to loom ever longer, Roosevelt retreated sharply from his earlier forth night standAt Valta in February 1945, the President endorsed a proposal under which colonies would be placed in trusteeship only with the approval of the other country. In view of Frances announced intention to return to its former colony, this plan implicitly precluded a trusteeship for Indochina. (p.14) This shift coincided with the growing fear of the Soviet Union and its global designs. American skepticism about French policy in Asia continued to be outweighed by European concerns. In the spring of 1947, the Unites States formally committed itself to the containment of the Soviet expansion in Europe. (p. 70) Because France was seen as an essential component of this strategy, American support for French designs in Vietnam was to become policy. As France was dragged de...
