r an invasion of Cuba.Meanwhile, it was concluded on June 1961 by the United States that action should be taken to deploy International Range Ballistic missiles to Turkey, This conclusion was based primarily on the view that, in the aftermath of tensions in Vienna, cancellation of the IRBM deployment would be seen as a sign of weakness for the US. Indeed many of the moves made by America during the cold war period were governed by the fear of appearing weak to the USSR. The IRBMs in Turkey provided both an impetus and a justification for Khrushchevs decision to deploy missiles to Cuba. (Wyden, 137) The decision was driven in part, if not predominately by the desire to prevent an expected US attack on Cuba (Wyden, 155) The United States in fact, wasnt weak at all, compared to Russia. U.S. Intelligence concluded in 1961 that previous estimates of Soviet nuclear strength had been overstated. Indeed, by the time of the missile crisis, the Soviet Union had only twenty to forty intercontinental ballistic missiles, compared to over one hundred and seventy by the United States. Overall in fact, the United States had a three thousand to two hundred and fifty missile advantage. (Wyden, 136) As the disparity in power continued to widen, Soviet leaders feared that the US might gain advantage for a preemptive nuclear strike or use their nuclear superiority to compel political concessions from the Soviets on international issues. (Wyden, 136) The United States viewed five threats that would be posed from Russian missiles in Cuba. A) Cuba might join with the USSR in setting up an offensive air or military base B) it may threaten the safety of other Latin American countries, currently friendly with America, and Democracy. C) It would set up covert operations, threatening the independence of Latin American countries from within D) Cubas ideological contours are moral and political offense to the US, and we are committed to remove that offense, including...
