the side of the soldiers, as spring gave away to summer. Through the late hours of August 18, 1942, the Allied strike force steamed across the English channeltoward Dieppe. The plan called for attacks at five different points on a front of roughly 16 kilometres. Foursimultaneous flank attacks were to go in just before dawn, followed half an hour later by the mainattack on the town of Dieppe itself (see figure 3). As the assault force approached the coast of Francein the early hours of August 19, the landing craft of the eastern sector unexpectedly encountered asmall German convoy. Its movements were earlier reflected on the radar in England and two warningsignals were accordingly sent out. These had no effect, although they were received by at least some ofthe vessel of the Allied forces. The noise of the sharp violent sea fight which followed alerted coastaldefences, particularly at Berneval and Puys, leaving little chance of success in this sector. The craftcarrying No.3 Commando were scattered and most of the unit never reached shore. Due to inaccuratereporting Lt. Col. Durnford-Slater, after reporting to General Roberts on the headquarters ship off 2Dieppe, returned to England without knowing that seven of his twenty-three crafts landed their troops. These troops were quickly overwhelmed without their leader. One small party of twenty commandos managed to get within hundred and eighty metres of the battery and by accurate snipping prevented theguns from firing on the assault ships for two-and-one-half hours before they were safely evacuated(Souster, 94).At Puys the Royal Regiment of Canada shared in the ill-fortune where German soldiers werestrategically placed at narrow and lofty cliffs. Success depended on surprise and darkness, neither ofwhich prevailed as the naval landing was delayed; the Royals leapt ashore in the growing light to meetviolent machine-gun fire from the fully-alerted Ge...
