officer in Moscow is about $200 a month, while street patrols in the capital can demand $100 to look away if they spot drunk drivers. Experienced detectives leave the service. Junior and mid-level judges get about $160 month, less than half what a secretary receives in the burgeoning private sector. And the anticipated gain is always high enough to dwarf the expected punishment.With property rights unclear and lacking well-established rules, government officials in charge of redistributing property and company insiders with the necessary connections can hardly resist the available opportunities to enrich themselves. Presumably, many privatizations were inappropriate if not downright fradulent. Although the real scale of misrepresentation probably will never be revealed because of the involvement of top officials. (For example, in late 1992, before Gazprom was privatized, the giant Russian natural gas monopoly was valued officially at $298 million; Western sources however, estimated its realmarket value as at least $250 billion.) Clearly, some in the leadership are interested in maintaining uncertainty and delaying the introduction of clear rules that could dramatically reduce their profits and rents from the redistribution of assets.Because of the highly discretionary process of resource and benefits allocation by government staff, rent-seeking is rampant. Reports indicated, for example, that, with a 10 to 20 percent commission paid in cash criminal groups could persuade commercial banks to provide an advantageous credit line. Another example: "Sports Foundation," a nongovernmental organization with government connections, was granted an export/import tax exemption that helped it keep $4.2 billion in profits. The price of such corrupt practices can be steep. The high murder rate of directors of oil refinery enterprises (second only to that of bankers) is explained by their access to almost unlimited rents and opportunities for theftR...
