nowledge as a true opinion or belief and a rational explanation (Plato 60). This view is more abstract than the other two earlier views of Plato on knowledge; as a matter of fact, it attacks two earlier views of Plato in Meno and Republic as the development of the theory of knowledge persists. As this argument continues, Plato believes that “knowledge is true opinion” (Plato 50) on the first move. A true opinion or belief cannot be equivalent to a true belief in a persuasive case in court. For instance, in a jury trial, the juror believes that the defendant is guilty from the attorney’s argument rather than seeing the concrete evidence (Plato 60). In this case, true opinion is not always knowledge; that is why this argument is weak. Furthermore, when there is a true opinion, there is also a false opinion that is not knowledge. In the case of “5+7=11”, “5+7” is the object of opinion and “=11” is not a false opinion which “is impossible… in the sphere of knowledge” (Jowett 249) but it is erring by “a confusion of thought and sense” (Plato 56). A true opinion must be what is the case and the object of the opinion must exist. Moreover, “the differences in the kinds and degrees of knowledge depend on the extent and the qualities of the wax” (Jowett 258). Therefore, it is agreeable that some true opinions can be knowledge. As Plato approaches to his final move on his argument, he explainsin the first place, the meaning may be, manifesting one’s thought by the voice with verbs and nouns, imaging an opinion in the stream which flows from the lips, as in a mirror or water. Does not this appear to you to be one kind of explanation (Plato 61).Plato thinks that explanation is “the reflection of thought in speech.-But this is not peculiar to those who know” and “the enumeration of the parts of a thing” (Jowett 2...
