nmathematical meaning. In the second experiment, the subjects were first asked of the typicality of the choices, then of the probability. The occurrence of the conjunction fallacy decreased in this experiment. The participants used the supplied information about Linda in the “typicality” phase, while inferring a more mathematical meaning in the “probability” phase. In the third experiment, the word probability was replaced altogether with frequency. This produced the least number of conjunction fallacies. Most of the subjects understood frequency to be a mathematical term. Thus they approached the problem in like manner. The experimenters conclude that the responses given to the original problem are completely reasonable given that a nonmathematical meaning is attached to “probability.” (Hertwig and Gigerenzer, pgs. 279-88)This is certainly true in everyday life. Whenever we make inferences about people we do not attach mathematical meanings to these. For example, what is the probability that our next president will be well educated? (Insert George W. joke here) According to Tversky and Khanerman’s method, anyone that guesses a high number is committing the conjunction fallacy. It is less likely to be president and well educated than president alone. Life simply does not work this way. We automatically assume that there are certain characteristics that one must meet in order to become president. Since the president is not selected at random, we assign high priority to the qualifications of the office. Therefore, education, a good one at that, is considered very important to a president. The prediction that our next president will be well educated is a very reasonable assumption.The above example may seem a far stretch to the Linda problem. A simple rearrangement will, however, make it very similar to the Linda problem. Given various biographies of individuals, if subjects are ...
