is a first order evil. At this point in the work Mackie questions whether good 5and evil are opposed. He states that they do not clearly oppose each other, but first order good contrasts with first order evil and they are both opposed by second order good (benevolence). Mackie then goes on to say that God’s goodness is more like a third order good, or the will to maximize the second order good. Mackie now moves to explain the objections to this solution. The first one is that possibly second and third order goods are means to first order goods. This he reveals is inconsistent because it would now make sense for God to keep misery in existence just to have things like benevolence. The second objection reveals that God is not benevolent or sympathetic nor is he concerned about minimizing first order evil. It says that he simply tries to promote second order good. Mackie now moves to the fatal objection/objection three. This objection considers a second order evil which would contrast with a second order good in the same way a first order evil contrasts with a first order good. This second order evil would be the same kind of evil that God, if he were wholly good and omnipotent, would eliminate. The ironic part of this objection is that second order evils plainly exist. Now Mackie is nearing the end of solution (iii) and he makes an attempt to use the solution in a different way. Mackie explains that since there is a third order good, there could be a third order evil. This Mackie states in order to express the pattern heading toward an infinite regress. Solution (iv) is the solution involving free will. This solution states, “Evil is due to human free will.” The solution assigns the problem of evil to human actions rather than to God. This assignment of free will leads to the question of why a wholly good God gave men free will knowing that it would eventually lead to a decision of evil. 6Mackie thin...
