for the veracity of one `cause' over another. Perhaps this is among the trends that have led many Weber scholars astray, especially since "Weber feels that no cause can be `proved', simply by intellectual means, to be superior to any other." 14 Despite his own attachment to, for example, the values of individual liberty, his "philosophical stance did not provide a mechanism for validating democratic values in and of themselves." 15How can Weber's arguments for his ultimate values be reconciled with the view that value-free analysis can be conducted only after a value or purpose has been established? Lassman and Speirs, in their introduction to Weber: Political Writings, provide the answer. "Although Weber believed that values could not be given any form of `ultimate' foundation, it was possible and indeed necessary" 16 to argue for them because "the tensions between competing values are essential in order to prevent cultural stagnation." 17 Even though Lassman and Speirs do not explain precisely how it is possible to put forth objective arguments supporting subjective values while maintaining a commitment to truth, they do allude to one solution: Weber's "scholarly investigations and political essays have the purpose of making clear, in an objective manner as possible, the realities and possibilities given in any particular situation." 18Having examined Weber's views of the role of perspective and values in social scientific analysis, the evidence, both from Weber's writings and from commentaries on them, must now be considered in support of the interpretation that Weber took a two-tier approach to value-free social science. First, it must be shown that held Weber believed ultimate values could not be proved scientifically, a position alluded to in several preceding remarks. Lassman and Speirs, writing in their introduction to Weber: Political Writings, address the matter directly. Weber held the belief, they say, that "there is no lon...
