for the actions of the social scientist, showing that the values he seeks to serve are also a question of faith. The argument by extension notwithstanding, there is other evidence that Weber held the social scientist's values to be a subjective matter. Portis, for instance, says Weber "believed it impossible to justify ultimate values scientifically. He presumed they were derived from the metaphysical commitments that define one's general outlook." 22 Rogers Brubaker, in The Limits of Rationality, also acknowledges that Weber's discussion of value orientations amplifies those of a long line of ethical relativists. Weber believed that "value orientations are essentially subjective, and that conflict among them cannot be rationally resolved." 23Furthermore, Weber believed that value orientations could not be eliminated from social scientific work. They necessarily determine the analyst's perspective. Portis writes that Weber, in his Freiburg inaugural address, said "political economy was a `political science,' in the sense that it must proceed from a value perspective." 24 More crucially, Portis goes on to quote Weber as writing that "`there is no "objective" scientific analysis of culture ... or "social phenomena" independent of special and "one-sided" viewpoints -- expressly or tacitly, consciously or unconsciously -- they are selected, analyzed, and organized for expository purposes.'" 25But how, given this assertion by Weber, can he be seen to advocate a value-free analysis once a perspective has been established? The first hint lies in the quotation itself. Weber does say that there is no objective analysis "independent of special and `one-sided' viewpoints," a remark that does not rule out objectivity, only objectivity prior to a perspective. This interpretation of Weber's position derives additional support from other comments Weber made regarding objectivity. Example: One of the "deadly sins in the area of politics" is, Weber says...
