fit plan expressly gave the plan administrator discretionary authority to interpret the plan and it’s terms. The court determined that the language used in the plan did give the administrator discretion and the ability to interpret the benefit plan. Id at 657. The court then held that even though the administrator could interpret the plan, he had done so arbitrarily and capriciously, and therefore the plaintiff was due his benefits. Id. In Pratt, the court stated that they would uphold the administrator decision to deny the benefits, unless the decision was determined to be “(1) arbitrary and capricious, (2) not supported by substantial evidence, or (3) erroneous on a question of law.” Id. Since the court would have enforced the administrators decision, but for the above three determinations, the court strictly applied the Brunch opinion. Very similar to the “strict” approach is the “flexible arbitrary and capricious” interpretation. The “flexible” approach has been enforced in the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Circuits, and is merely a extension of the “strict” interpretation. Again, the “flexible” interpretation allows the court to apply the “strict” interpretation, but slides to a more stringent standard of judicial review whenever a plan administrator or fiduciary is shown to be under some type of conflict of interest. Further, the standard becomes stricter and stricter, the larger the apparent conflict of interest is shown to be. The Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Circuits all allow a very broad and/or generic grant of discretionary power, in order to trigger a differential review. See Batchelor v. Int’l Board of Elec. Workers, 877 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1989), Davis v. Kentucky Financial Co., 887 F.2d 689 (6th 1989), Lister v. Stark, 942 F.2d 1183 (7th 1991). However, the Eight Circuit seems to require a much more carefully drafte...
