ster that "it had never seen me or my computer before." Farmer Dec. P 29. Farmer also cast doubt on Napster's contention that blocking IP addresses is not a reasonable means of terminating infringers. He noted that Napster bans the IP addresses of users who runs "bots" n8 on the service. See id. P 27. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - n8 Farmer informed that court that "A bot' is a robot, or program, that performs actions continuously, in a sort of manic or robotic fashion." Farmer Dec. P 27. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Hence, plaintiffs raise genuine issues of material fact about whether Napster has reasonably implemented a policy of terminating repeat infringers. They have produced evidence that Napster's copyright compliance policy is neither timely nor reasonable within the meaning of subparagraph 512(i)(A). CONCLUSION This court has determined above that Napster does not meet the requirements of subsection 512(a) because it does not [*30] transmit, route, or provide connections for allegedly infringing material through its system. The court also finds summary adjudication inappropriate due to the existence of genuine issues of material fact about Napster's compliance with subparagraph 512(i)(A), which a service provider must satisfy to enjoy the protection of any section 512 safe harbor. Defendant's motion for summary adjudication is DENIED. IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: May 5, 2000 MARILYN HALL PATEL Chief Judge United States District Court Northern District of California ...
