ased on that particular nations ability to move toward democracy and a free market economy. Because of this commitment to a movement toward democracy, the United States eagerly awaited the results of the election in 1990. These elections, however, brought into power nationalists of many colors. In Slovenia and Croatia, the election brought to power two leaders who advocated the secession of their respective republics from federal Yugoslavia. Additionally, the reelection of Milosevic in Serbia aroused fears that Yugoslavia would be dominated by a Greater Serbia. The future of Yugoslavia was uncertain and finally became an issue of importance in the State Department and the White House.Yugoslavias existence itself was at stake and the State Department had to ask itself two questions. One, what are the chances that Yugoslavia will disintegrate? Two, what will disintegration mean? The Central Intelligence Agency was the first to predict the breakup of Yugoslavia in September of 1990. This breakup, as examined by experts in the embassy in Belgrade and in Washington, was certainly seen as potentially violent and leading to war. The State Department did make attempts to alert the Western Allies in NATO of the potential for armed conflict but it fell upon deaf ears (Zimmerman, 5).One of the fundamental problems with United States policy in Yugoslavia was that democracy and unity seemed to contradict each other. A democratic movement in Croatia and Slovenia elected separatist governments. The United States wanted a united Yugoslavia but Croatia and Slovenia were flirting with independence and if the rest of Yugoslavia were to order the JNA into those republics to quell the violence, would the United States support this action. Clearly, the objective of keeping a united Yugoslavia would be obtained but human rights violations as well as continuing armed conflict in defense of the separatist governments meant that peace in the Balkans...
