gination which contains nodefinite concept, but is bound up in "a multiplicity of partialrepresentations." (page 179). Imagination and understanding are therefore the two mental powersthat constitute genius. As these mental powers cannot be adequatelyexplained through language, they cannot be learnt or taught, but canbe communicated to others through soul. Having summarised his definition of what is meant by genius, Kantexpands on his previously mentioned notion of how the work of a geniuscan be used by others. "...the product of a genius...is an example, notfor imitation...but to be followed by another genius -one whom itarouses to a sense of his own originality in putting freedom from theconstraint of rules so into force in his art." (page 181). As geniuses area rare phenomenon according to Kant, the work of a genius can also beused to give rise to a school, where the pupils can imitate the work ofa genius to produce other works of art (though not of genius). However,it is important that this imitation does not become aping, where thepupil copies everything in a work including the blemishes containedtherein. While the blemishes may suit the work of a genius well, theyshould not be imitated. Kant finishes his discussion by asserting that where there is aconflict between taste and genius, then it is the genius that should besacrificed, as it is taste that "introduces a clearness and order into theplenitude of thought, and in so doing gives a stability to the ideas, andqualifies them at once for universal and permanent approval." (page183). In summary, "the requisites for fine art are, therefore, imagination,understanding, soul and taste." (page 183). Kant's account of genius, though very extensive in its analysis andconclusions, lays itself open to a great deal of criticism and debate. Even on what might seem a less controversial part of his argument, thatthe ideas that constitute genius cannot be set out in rules as...
