ievement - oriented peers were opting for marriage (Allen & Kalish, p. 141). Women now in the labor market want more than just a job, and therefore, actively pursue a career. Between 1969 and 1979, for example, percentages of women endorsing wanting to be an authority in my field increased from 54.3% to 70.5% and in 1979 were only 4.8% lower than the percentage for men. Women endorsing wanting to raise a family declined in these years from 77.8% to64.8% which equals the percentage for men. (Long, 1983). Beckers (1981) theories of marriage and family behavior hypothesize that womens increasing labor force participation has had a critical and presumably irreversible impact on the family. If half of all marriages are to fail, and with alimony for ex-wives less common, a woman cannot count upon marriage for a lifetime of economicsecurity (Allen & Kalish). Mens economic status has substantially deteriorated since the 1970s (Oppenheimer, 1994). The median income of men aged 25 to 34 fell by 26% between 1972 and 1994 (Koontz, 1997). The institution of marriage underwent a particularly rebellious and dramatic shift when women entered the work force. People dont have to stay married because of economic forces now . . . we are in the midst of trying to renegotiate what the marriage contracts is - what men and women are suppose to do as partners (Gleick, 1995). Studies show the lowest marriage rate of all is for women professionals (i.e., doctors, lawyers). While over three-fourths of all women in the United States aged 35 to 39 are married, fewer than two thirds of theseare professional women. Further, when they do marry, professional women are more likely to divorce than their age peers. As for childbearing, these women have significantly fewer children than their nonprofessional counterparts, when they have children at all (Allen & Kalish). In the case of having children Oppenheimer argues that the major component of the cost of chi...