is called for cooperation by the Soviet Union and the United States. The transaction and information costs in the crisis, though substantial, did not preclude cooperation. By contrast, the problem of identifying significant actors, defining interests, and negotiating agreements that embodied mutual interests in the case of 1914 was far more difficult. There was no common procedure to handle the situation or resolve it in an efficient manner.In international politics, the likelihood of autonomous defection and of recognition and control problems increases. Cooperative behavior rests on calculations of expected utility - merging discount rates, payoff structures, and anticipated behavior of other players. Nations dwell in perpetual lawlessness, for no central authority with a defined law limits on the pursuit of sovereign interests. This common condition gives rise to diverse outcomes. War and concert, arms races and arms control, trade wars and tariff truces, financial panics and rescues, competitive devaluation and monetary stabilization mark relations among states. At times, the absences of centralized international authority preclude attainment of common goals. Because, as states, they cannot cede ultimate control over their conduct to a world government, they cannot guarantee that they will adhere to their commitments. The possibility of a breach of promise can impede cooperation even when cooperation would leave all well off. Yet, at other times, states do realize common goals though cooperation under lawlessness. Despite the absence of any ultimate international law, governments often bind themselves to mutually advantageous courses of action. And, though no international sovereign stands ready to enforce the terms of agreement, modern states can and do realize common interests through tacit cooperation, formal bilateral and multilateral negotiation, and the creation if international regimes....
