ble politics is at stake. The difference of this system with regard to the problems of internationalization and common dependence of most EU members stresses the fact the system is practically highly immune to change. From the two models discussed above, the economic community seems to reflect the present state of the integration process and its development options in the near future. This type also highlights the political problems caused by the integration process. The network model takes these features into account and tries to build an acceptable political order on this basis but overlooks the fundamental asymmetry between the European market and the national state. The European internal market is widely accepted in most political camps. In addition, it is not only institutionalized in a kind of economic constitution but also stabilized by particular interests in the EU. Democratic policy-making mainly takes place within the nation-state. Whether such an asymmetrical political order can become permanently legitimate in the eyes of citizens depends on how disintegrative effects of the integration process and relative deprivations are perceived and judged by the very people. The introduction of a common currency and eventual enlargement of the EU could be the decisive test for showing whether possible negative effects on individuals would be perceived as legitimate and appropriate. High economic and political turmoil that can appear after Euro or after inviting new countries into EU could lead to the formation of political movements against integration (within EU and also integration of new members), which can be stronger and more persistent than the ones that appeared during the referenda on the Maastricht Treaty. The perception of negative consequences of integration and the possible formation of political movements responding to this perception is, however, not directly linked to the real strength of such negative consequences but ...
