ic efficiency, prudent use of government resources, and justice for minorities, as well as furthering important non-corrective goals. These are some of the programs that were looked favorably upon by the Burger and early Rehnquist Courts in a series of important cases in the 1970s and 1980s. These policies and decisions were and remain quite controversial. Many people view such race-conscious policies as reverse discrimination, no better than, or in their own way as harmful as, the racism they aim to combat. Some legal scholars, accepting this characterization, have argued that racial preference policies, whatever their purpose, are unconstitutional, breaching the equal protection clause, which, they say, requires a color-blind reading of the Constitution. This is not Justice Harlan's view. Neither is it consistent with the history of equal protection clause jurisprudence. His view, allowing racial preferences that pass the strict scrutiny test, is more consistent with traditional doctrine, although not fully so. Within the last fifteen years we have had cases like Richmond v. Croson Company, the Pena case previously mentioned, and of course Bakke v. Regents of the University of California also previously mentioned. In each case we are dealing with issues that supposedly were put to a halt with the 13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments. The Constitution continues to help some people and hinder others. Still over a hundred years later, we are still having conflicting results and are still referring to Harlan's dissenting opinion about a color blind Constitution.Every time the Supreme Court rules in favor of one thing the equal protection pendulum swings the other way just enough to inflict color on this color blind Constitution. Will the Constitution ever be color blind? One day when every race is mixed together and no one can claim that they are solely of one particular ethnic origin is when this color blind Constitution will occur. T...
