by showing (i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant’s qualifications.” The courts have since then attempted to apply this standard to instances of reverse discrimination, coupling it with the decision handed down by the Supreme Court three years later in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail stating that Title VII “proscribes racial discrimination in employment against whites in the same terms as nonwhites.” The D.C. Circuit Court in Harding v. Gray later expanded on this test to add “background evidence” which can be generally divided into two categories: (1) evidence indicting that the particular employer at issue has some reason or inclination to discriminate invidiously against whites,…and (2) evidence indicating that there is something’fishy’ about the facts of the case at hand that raises an inference of discrimination.” This places the burden on the plaintiff (employee) to establish that the defendant (employer) is a ‘unique employer that discriminates against the majority’. (Gianni, 3) The U.S.3rd Circuit Court of Appeals in September 1999 rejected this line of reasoning in Iadimarco v. Runyon. Judge Theodore McKee wrote an opinion for a three-judge panel stating that the “background circumstances” requirement raises the bar higher for white male plaintiffs than for minority/female plaintiffs and the concept is “irremediably vague and ill-defined.” Judge McKee wrote “All that should be required to establish a prima facie case in the context of ‘reverse discrimination’ is for the plaintiff to present sufficient evidence to allow a fact f...
