ssfrom actual involuntariness and stated that if, "...in a given case, the officers conductamounts to abuse, that case, like those involving coercion or duress, may be taken care ofwhen it arises measured by the traditional standards for evaluating voluntariness andtrustworthiness" (Haas Court). A statement that is in fact involuntary is inadmissible forany purpose including impeachment.In Doyle v. Ohio, two suspects elected to remain silent after they had been told bypolice during Miranda warnings that they had a right to remain silent. The Supreme Courtruled that it was a due process violation to use their silence to impeach them during theirrespective trials. The Court reasoned that the Miranda warnings carry the implicit promisethat if suspects remain silent, that silence will not be used against them. The SupremeCourt thought it unfair to penalize the defendants by allowing their silence to be used toimpeach them, after they had relied upon the assurances of the police that they had a rightto remain silent. However, if the defendants in Doyle had not been told by police that theyhad a right to remain silent, there would have been no due process violation if their silencewas subsequently used to impeach their credibility. Under those circumstances, theirsilence would not have been induced by the implicit promise in the Miranda warnings thattheir silence would not be used against them (Bender, 79).In Michigan v. Tucker, the Supreme Court held that a witness may testify at trial,even though the defendant identified that person as a witness in a statement taken inviolation of Miranda. Prior to Tucker's custodial interrogation, the police advised him ofthe Miranda warnings, except the right to appointed counsel. The Court determined thatderivative evidence, such as the witness' identity, may be suppressed, but only if the policeobtained it by infringing on the defendant's constitutional rights. The Court distinguishedbetween a violat...
