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If so, does it do so significantly better than other forms of punishment? Dozens of studies have examined the relationship between murder and the death penalty in Canada, the United States and elsewhere. They have compared murder rates in areas with the death penalty to those in areas without the death penalty. They examined what happened to murder rates when the death penalty was added or removed in various areas and countries. None of these studies, however, has been able to establish that the death penalty results in lower murder rates or that the abolition of the death penalty increases murder rates. If the death penalty deters, the deterrent effect is so small that even the most sophisticated attempts have been unable to measure it. The vast preponderance of evidence suggests that the death penalty is no more effective than imprisonment in deterring others from committing violent crime. Since Canada abolished the death penalty in 1976, substituting mandatory minimum prison sentences, the homicide rate has actually fallen by 27%. This pattern also has been observed in France and elsewhere. Actually, the death penalty may have an effect that is the opposite of what is intended. After John Spenkelink was executed in Florida homicides seemed to rise, and observers have noted the same phenomenon in other circumstances. Some recent studies seem to substantiate that pattern. One study in New York suggests that an execution will result in two or three extra homicides in the following months within that state alone, and possibly more in the entire country. Rather than preventing violence, capital punishment may have a "brutalizing effect" that increases the level of violence in our society. It may in fact raise, not lower, murder rates. How could the threat of death fail to prevent -- and possibly even cause -- violence? To understand this phenomenon, we must look at the theory of general deterrence, especially as it relates to the death penalty. The idea of deterrence assumes that: 1. Each of us decides our actions by weighing the cost of these actions against the benefits. When the cost -- in this case the threat of death -- outweighs the potential benefits, we are discouraged from committing crimes. Crime is the result of conscious, rational choices. 2. People have a good idea of costs and a high degree of certainty that they will suffer the costs. 3. The consequences are seen as a significant cost at the time of the act. 4. A potential offender identifies with those being punished. These assumptions of deterrence theory fail to take into account the nature and meaning of interpersonal violence. They are often unrealistic when applied to the death penalty. 1. Some crimes, such as tax evasion, involve considerable rational planning and deterrence may have relevance to them. What we know about murder, however, indicates that most homicides are acts of passion -- impulsive acts committed under tremendous stress and/or the influence of alcohol or drugs by individuals prone to aggressive, impulsive behavior. These people do not make rational calculations of pain and gain at the time of their acts. There are, of course, some carefully planned, premeditated murders. However, people committing these murders usually do not expect to be caught. They do not identify with the person "dumb enough" to get caught and convicted, or they decide that the risks of committing murder are worth the benefit. However, to say that most people murder irrationally is not to say that their violence is completely capricious, without a purpose or logic of its own in the mind of the perpetrator. Many acts of violence are a distorted way of asserting one's sense of self-worth or of getting recognition. A former armed robber said, "At least with a shotgun in my hand I was somebody." 2. To be deterred, a potential offender needs to know the cost of his or her crime and the likelihood that he or she will suffer these costs. Yet, this is almost impossible to calculate. Few murderers are caught, prosecuted, sentenced and actually executed. From the 1930s to the 1960s, when executions were frequent, less than one execution occurred for every 70 murders. Over the past twenty years, an average of only one out of every one hundred persons convicted of murder was actually sentenced to death. As a result of all of these variables, it is impossible for a potential killer to know with certainty that if he or she kills, the death sentence will be the consequence. Yet knowledge and certainty of cost is a key assumption of deterrence theory. To make the cost of murder certain, we would have to quickly and automatically execute convicted murderers, regardless of circumstances. To apply the death penalty in such a way, we would need to abolish most of the procedural safeguards and constitutional rights we now have. We would have to be willing to execute some innocent people. We would have to be willing to increase the chances for the misuse of our legal system. In order to do that, we would have to be willing to give up our own access to those legal safeguards as well. We would have to opt for a justice system without room for mercy, without the possibility of considering circumstances and individuals. 3. For deterrence to work, the potential offender must see the penalty as a significant threat. But some people commit murder as a way of punishing themselves or of committing suicide. Others see it as a way to gain notoriety. For them, the consequence is an attraction. This may explain in part why executions encourage some homicides and why some convicted killers have asked to die. 4. But there is an additional reason: The real message of the death penalty is the legitimacy of lethal violence. Some potential killers see executions as evidence that lethal vengeance is justified. Instead of identifying with the offender who was caught and executed, they identify with the executioner. They learn from these executions that it is acceptable to eliminate someone who wrongs them, that violence is justified against the deserving. One study has concluded that the atmosphere of violence surrounding an execution encourages someone who has reached "a state of readiness to kill" to translate this attitude into action. Many argue that a primary function of the death penalty is to communicate the message that killing is taboo. Certainly we need to make that statement, and strongly. But other ways may be more effective. The example of a life for a life may actually cheapen life, not increase its value. Because these assumptions about the deterrent effect of the death penalty are inaccurate, the death penalty has offered us a false sense of security. And we are left with a series of moral dilemmas: Can we bear the moral weight of taking a life when the effect is so minuscule that we cannot measure it, and for an effect that we can have, at least as effectively, by alternatives short of death? Can we take a life when our action may actually encourage violence? Even if the death penalty did deter, do we have the moral right to take the life of one person hoping that we might possibly deter another person? Specific deterrence refers to the fact that executing a known offender prevents that person from killing again, "deterring" at least that specific offender. Preventing the recurrence of murder is certainly a serious concern. Families of murder victims wrestle with this issue, as we all must. Although death incapacitates, it does so at a high social and moral cost. Alternative ways of restraining offenders do exist. And not all offenders require permanent restraint. There are dangerous people who must be restrained on a long-term basis. Under current law, some of these individuals are released too early, a legitimate cause for concern. Yet statistics reveal that many murderers commit the crime once in a lifetime. Such murders happen under extreme pressure and abnormal circumstances and are unlikely to be repeated. Statistically, people convicted of murder are among the most unlikely to commit violent crimes again, either inside or outside prisons. Prison wardens often observe that murderers are among the easiest prisoners to handle. Moreover, some murderers genuinely do reform. Provisions are needed to take such transformations into account. The death penalty does incapacitate but so can imprisonment for those who need long-term restraint. While legal changes are needed to help sort out those who require such restraint and to ensure restraint for those who need it, imprisonment can protect society effectively. The questions are whether the death penalty prevents murders significantly better than imprisonment does and whether any possible advantage outweighs the substantial costs. Is our legal system adequate for decisions of life and death? Can our legal system dispense justice accurately and fairly? This question is especially important in the case of the death penalty. Capital punishment is different from any other punishment: It involves the termination of life itself and therefore is irreversible. If we are to take a step so drastic, we must be careful that we apply it rationally and without error. The U.S. Supreme Court recognizes this requirement. It demands special trial procedures such as a two-stage trial that separates questions of guilt from questions of penalty. Similarly, it requires opportunity for appeal and review of decisions in cases involving the death penalty. Can the death penalty be accurately applied? Few argue that the death penalty is worth the risk of executing innocent people. Many argue, however, that chances of error are minimal because of numerous procedural safeguards. In reality, though, opportunities for error are numerous. The historical record shows that many innocent people have been convicted of capital crimes, and some have been executed. Errors are difficult to research, but a 1985 study has identified over 200 cases involving nearly 350 defendants who, although innocent, were convicted in this century of crimes that were or could have been capital cases. These researchers identified 23 cases in which innocent people were executed, and an additional 27 in which the execution of innocents was stayed within only three days of the execution. In a recent case, Ricardo Aldape Guerra spent 14 years in prison, all of them on death row, for a crime he did not commit. He was eventually acquitted and released, but only after an extraordinary effort. Few cases are subjected to such scrutiny. Opportunities for errors are many, despite complex safeguards. First, the quality of legal counsel is a factor. Representing a defendant in a death penalty case is one of the most difficult, thankless and costly assignments. Yet most attorneys in such cases are underpaid and inexperienced in death penalty law. Second, death penalty juries tend to exclude those who have serious reservations about the death penalty. Recent studies of such juries suggest that they do not represent the community as a whole and that they may be more prone to convict than the general population. Third, death penalty cases are usually appealed, but appeal courts can only look at points of law. They cannot question the evidence or look at evidence introduced after the trial. An appeal may be lost simply because the attorney failed to raise an objection to a procedural error at the proper time. No legal system, guided as it must be by human judgment, can eliminate the possibility of errors. In the case of the death penalty, errors are irreversible. Is the death penalty applied arbitrarily or discriminatorily? In 1972, the U.S. Supreme Court in effect called a moratorium on executions by finding (in Furman v. Georgia) that capital punishment as then administered was unconstitutional because of the arbitrary and discriminatory way in which it was applied. Juries had been free to sentence defendants without guidelines that ensured rational and uniform decisions. As a result, the death penalty was applied much more frequently to African American defendants than others and there were no uniform standards for what cases justified execution. The Court did not rule out the death penalty as such. Later, the Court ruled that mandatory sentences were unacceptable because moral standards require room for mercy and individual considerations. The Court said that states could not automatically execute defendants for certain crimes as a way of eliminating arbitrary and discriminatory patterns. Instead, the Court required "guided discretion" that would leave room for individual considerations, yet allow for uniform and rational standards. New death penalty laws were designed in many states with these guidelines in mind. By the mid-1970s, the death penalty had been reinstated. Have these new procedures caused courts to apply the death penalty without regard to race, ethnicity or gender? Is it now applied rationally, to the most dangerous and most "deserving"? Is it applied uniformly from area to area? In fact, the new sentencing patterns have not significantly changed from earlier, pre-Furman patterns. The death penalty continues to be applied in a discriminatory way. Death row continues to hold a disproportionate number of the poor, the Black, the mentally handicapped and the disturbed. The death penalty is still applied capriciously. Death rows do not necessarily contain the most dangerous or deserving people. Most people on death row are poor -- a full 90 percent could not afford to hire their own attorney to ensure a fair and thorough defense. What Supreme Court Justice William Douglas once said still holds true: "One searches in vain for the execution of any member of the affluent strata of our society." Only a tiny minority on death row are women, even though women commit about one in five criminal homicides. Almost half are Black, when African Americans make up only 12 percent of the population. One study found that the proportion of non-whites on death row was higher after than before the Furman decision. Prejudice operates in subtle ways. Although the race of the offender is important in determining whether he or she is sentenced to die, the race of the victim is also important. A person, especially a black person, who kills a white person is much more likely to be sentenced to death than the killer of a black person -- an average of 22 times more likely, in the case of African American offenders nationwide. African Americans are the most frequent victims of homicide in the United States; over half of murder victims are black. Yet between 1976 and 1993, an average of 83 percent of those on death row were there for killing whites. The message is clear -- black lives are worth less than white lives. Arbitrary sentencing crops up in other ways, too. One community may be more harsh in its sentencing than another. In addition, those who refuse to give evidence or plead guilty end up on death row more frequently than other, often more dangerous offenders who play the game more successfully. Ironically, a guilty person who plea bargains may be better off than an innocent person who sticks to the truth. Finally, accomplices may be sentenced to die while principals are not. Jerome Bowden was executed in 1986 even though the prosecutor in his case had asked for a reprieve on the grounds that Bowden's partner had received a prison sentence, and Bowden himself had the mental capacity of a 12-year-old. No one knew which of the two had actually fired the fatal shot. In short, only about one percent of all killers end up on death row. They are not necessarily the worst one percent but the unluckiest. No one knows exactly why they have been selected. The death penalty is, in fact, a type of lottery in which the primary consistency is a pattern of discrimination. Arbitrariness and discrimination happen because the criminal justice process is inherently and necessarily discretionary, leaving room for mercy but also for injustice. Such arbitrariness cannot be eliminated successfully. There are simply too many variables. The quality of legal defense is crucial. One study has suggested that the lawyer's ability to raise or create question of appealable error, more than anything else, determines who will die. Moreover, the judicial process is full of discretionary points where human choices must be made. There are questions of what to charge and what penalty to ask. Both jury and prosecutor are faced with judgments as to which crimes are "especially heinous, atrocious and cruel," and such judgments are necessarily imprecise. Juries have to make judgments on insanity and premeditation. They can always decide in favor of a "lesser included offense" instead of the offense charged, and this latter decision is not reviewable. Decisions of aggravation and mitigation are highly discretionary. The variables cannot be eliminated. We cannot remove discretion and still leave room for mercy. Yet it is impossible to devise precise standards controlling human decisions and actions. When we execute, inevitably we will do so arbitrarily and sometimes mistakenly. Murder victims die arbitrarily and innocently, and the wrong of that needs to be acknowledged. But can that justify such action on the part of a government? Are the arguments for the death penalty sufficient to justify executing some innocent people and executing others without clear, rational guidelines? The death penalty may appear to be a cost-effective punishment that is cheaper to the taxpayer than prolonged imprisonment. Yet studies reveal that a criminal justice system with the death penalty is considerably more expensive than one without the death penalty. The death penalty is expensive because the trial process in death penalty cases is longer and more complicated than other trials owing to the safeguards required to minimize errors and arbitrariness. The appeals process is also more costly. And costs of maintaining those on death row are higher than normal prison costs. Even after spending huge sums on trials, appeals and death row, many people who are tried do not actually receive the death penalty, adding the costs of long-term imprisonment to the costs of the death penalty trial and appeal. Executions themselves are surprisingly expensive. A recent Texas study estimated that costs for trial, appeal, housing on death row and execution run to more than $2,300,000 per person -- three times the cost of keeping a person in a maximum security prison for 40 years. Similarly, New Yorkers were told it would cost them $118 million annually to reinstate the death penalty. But even if the death penalty did save money, could financial considerations justify taking life? When we as a society spend so much time and so many resources condemning a few offenders to death, then we are choosing not to spend them in ways that could save lives by preventing murders. Two developments have raised this question in recent years: the move to use "more humane" methods of execution such as lethal injection, and decisions by some death row prisoners to die rather than continue to live under sentence of death. Death row and execution are inherently cruel, causing severe and inevitable physical and emotional suffering. The history of the death penalty is a progression of new methods of execution, each touted as more humane. Earlier in history, executions were intended to be as brutal as possible. Then the French introduced the guillotine as a better form of execution and Americans used the noose, the firing squad, the electric chair and the gas chamber. Each method has involved substantial suffering and horror for the person executed and each has failed to work properly at times, increasing the suffering. The graphic descriptions by the press of Pedro Medina's death in Florida in 1997, where flames a foot long shot out from the right side of his head as he was literally burned from the inside out, is a case in point. Lethal injection cannot eliminate these problems and has the additional problem of involving medical personnel, who are dedicated to saving life, in the taking of life. Nevertheless, some advocate lethal injection as a way to make the death penalty more palatable to society. Prisoners who have chosen to be executed have helped focus attention on the nature of life on death row. When we examine these conditions, it is doubtful that those who request death are in a position to make a free, informed choice. It is more likely that the conditions on death row and the pressures of the death penalty caused them to choose death. Life on death row has been called a "living death." It is characterized by intense psychological stress and extreme feelings of powerlessness, loneliness, fear and emotional emptiness beyond what a person normally experiences in prison. Meager hope alternates with deep despair. The fear of execution mixes with pressures caused by prolonged isolation and deprivation. As one observer has noted, death row normally drives one crazy. Given such conditions, it is no wonder that some prisoners choose to die. To execute them is to assist in state-induced suicide. People who kill cause extreme suffering to others and that suffering needs to be acknowledged. But can that justify the state's impos ition of such extreme, debilitating suffering? Because it is recognized as such a cruel as well as ineffective form of punishment, the death penalty has been outlawed by every developed country except the United States and Japan. Further, the U.S. is one of but five countries in the world which continues to sentence juveniles to death. Can we bear the moral cost of taking a life, especially under conditions that cause such intense suffering? Does the death penalty help victims? The families and friends of murder victims have intense and legitimate needs, most of which are overlooked by the criminal justice process as well as by opponents and proponents of the death penalty. Victims' loved ones need to know that what has happened to them is tragic, unfair and wrong. They need to be released from blame and to feel vindicated. They need people who will listen patiently, accept them and their feelings for what they are, who do not blame, judge or stigmatize them. They need opportunities to express their anger and to mourn. They need compensation for the damages and burdens caused by the offense. They need the right to information about the case and the right to participate in their own case. They need to be provided necessary services. They need to be freed from worry that this will happen again. Above all, they need to come to the point where their tragic loss -- which can never be forgotten -- no longer dominates their lives. The needs of families and friends of murder victims deserve much more consideration than we have given them. But are these needs really met effectively by killing someone else, by causing another family to be wrenched by grief and pain, by adding to the cycle of violence and vengeance? Does the death penalty heal or does it leave a bitter hate-filled legacy that is incompatible with real healing? In the publicity and ritual surrounding a trial, appeal and execution, a victim's family and friends often become a public spectacle. They are subjected to frequent indignities and damaging publicity at the time of the trial. Healing is retarded as they are dragged through the experience again, usually years later, at the time of appeal and execution. The ritual of the death penalty takes precedence over the ritual of mourning and remembrance. The offender receives attention and concern while the needs of the victim's survivors are overlooked. As the member of one murder victim's family has said, "Would it not be better if we spent more time and energy mourning the death and remembering the life? "When we concentrate on the killer to the exclusion of the victims, do we not wound our sense of humanity? . . . And most importantly, what are we teaching our children about the value of human life?" In general, the death penalty process would seem to hinder, not encourage, healing of individuals as well as of society at large. None of us can assume that the answers are easy. We all -- proponents as well as opponents of the death penalty -- must confess our frequent insensitivity to the needs of victims and their families. We must acknowledge that we all have been guilty of using victims to further our own arguments. We must search together for ways to take victims seriously. Without resolution of these needs, we should not be surprised when victims' families express extreme anger, frustration and even vindictiveness. So far we have analyzed the death penalty in secular and largely utilitarian terms. We now need to consider the issue from a Christian perspective. What does the Old Testament say about capital punishment? Supporters of the death penalty frequently cite the Old Testament to justify their position, so it is logical to look at the Old Testament first. Yet it is important to keep in mind that the New Testament must be the primary standard for Christians. The Old Testament has distinct connections with the New. Christ came to "fulfill" the law and consciously built on Old Testament traditions. So the Old Testament has relevance. Yet Christ came to institute a new order, a new creation. Consequently, the Old Testament must always be subordinate to, and interpreted in light of, the New Testament. Vengeance is a theme in the Old Testament, and the Old Testament does allow the death penalty. However, several qualifications must be kept in mind: 1) Retaliation in the Old Testament was not so much a requirement as a limitation on vengeance. In a society unaccustomed to the rule of law -- as was the case in early Hebrew history -- vengeance must be controlled. An "eye for an eye" was a rule that attempted to make retaliation proportionate to the offense. The law of talion (legal retaliation) moved Hebrew society from unlimited to limited retaliation. Thus "an eye for an eye" was not a command to seek vengeance but a limitation on such retribution. Retribution, like divorce, reflected a concession, not God's highest intent (Deuteronomy 24, Matthew 19:8). 2) The Old Testament death penalty included a number of offenses that our society does not consider capital. Offenses such as adultery were as much capital offenses as murder. To be consistent with the Old Testament use, we would need to apply the death penalty much more broadly than we do today, including for accidental manslaughter and rebellious teenagers without regard to intent or mitigating circumstances (Exodus 21). 3) The Old Testament and the later rabbinical tradition placed many restrictions on the application of the death penalty. An "eye for an eye" was one limitation. A set of rules for accepting substitutions was another. By Jesus' day, most penalties had evolved into some form of restitution. Mosaic law and the later rabbinical tradition established a strict set of judicial procedures for cases involving the death penalty. The standard of proof required to convict someone in such cases went beyond our standard of "beyond reasonable doubt" and required what amounted to absolute certainty. A conviction required at least two eye witnesses, and witnesses who lied subjected themselves to the same penalty as the accused (e.g. Deuteronomy 17 and 19). Hebrew law thus actually became more restrictive than our own, and fewer people could be convicted. More restrictions were added later so that by the second century the sanction was rarely carried out. 4) A frequent theme in the Old Testament is mercy for the offender. The first recorded murder was followed by an act of God that granted protection to the murderer (Genesis 4). Cities of refuge were to be provided as sanctuaries where the guilty could escape the revenge of the victim's family (Numbers 35, Deuteronomy 4 and 19, Joshua 20). These sanctuaries allowed time for tempers to cool and a solution to be worked out. The themes of Deuteronomy 32:35 -- "To me belong vengeance and recompense" -- and of Leviticus 19:18 -- "You shall not take vengeance . . . but shall love your neighbor as yourself" -- recur frequently in the Old Testament. 5) The concept of taking a life for a life was a sacrificial and ceremonial action more than a legal one. A killing was a religious evil that demanded compensation through a religious ceremony (Genesis 9, Exodus 21, Deuteronomy 19). Executions were not so much a device for maintaining social order and protecting society but rather a way of righting a moral imbalance. The death penalty had a sacrificial and ceremonial more than a legal function; to draw parallels to modern use of capital punishment is fallacious. The Old Testament allowed capital punishment, but as a concession. Retribution was possible, but as a limitation, not as a command. Mercy was preferred. The death penalty served a primarily ceremonial function and was hedged with serious restrictions and reservations. But the Old Testament contains another perspective that is relevant to the death penalty. The Hebrew concept of justice was much more comprehensive than our own. It focused on "righteousness" and right relationships and was aimed at the shalom community where people live in right relationships with one another. In the Old Testament view, unequal wealth and power and unequal justice were as much a sin as were crimes. Any of these offenses -- including treating the poor unfairly -- were contrary to justice and to shalom. Given this holistic concept of justice, the death penalty as administered today seems incompatible with Old Testament justice for two reasons. First, our death penalty laws focus only on the crime without attempting to deal with the larger inequalities that may, in fact, have created the background for the offense. Second, the death penalty is administered unequally, falling most heavily on the poor and the powerless, again in contrast to the Old Testament vision of justice. In its application, therefore, the contemporary death penalty is fundamentally contradictory to the spirit of the Old Testament. What is the New Testament perspective on capital punishment? In the Old Testament, life was sacred. Life could only be taken in certain exceptional circumstances, ringed with restrictions, and then primarily for ceremonial or sacrificial reasons. In the New Testament, Jesus' answer to capital punishment was to undermine the penalty by demanding that both judges and executioners be sinless. On one occasion, Christ was asked to rule on a death penalty case (John 8). His response: "Let one without sin cast the first stone." And this was consistent with Christ's other teachings. He reminds his listeners to beware of condemning others because God's judgments do not necessarily coincide with our own (e.g. Matthew 25, Luke 6). If our judgments are so fallible, how can we make the decision to take a life? Moreover, the sacrificial aspect of taking a life was fulfilled "once and for all" by the sacrifice of Christ. Christ's death on the cross, itself an application of capital punishment, wiped away the Old Testament ceremonial and moral basis for the death penalty (e.g. Hebrews 10). No more blood needs to be shed to testify to the sacredness of life. Christ died that others may live. By trading places with the guilty and the enemy, by dying in the place of the murderer Barabbas, Christ closed off the Old Testament reason for the death penalty. Christ did not simply eliminate the rationale for the death penalty. He constantly reiterated our responsibility to see Christ in our needy neighbor, even in our enemies. We are told to love and forgive those who harm us, and to do so repeatedly. When Christ himself was executed, he gave a model response to his enemies in his dying words: "Father, forgive them." Jesus teaches that we are to love those who harm us and he sees no way to love a person without caring for their lives. If we love God, Jesus says we are obligated to show that love in our actions toward others. Christ moves us from the Old Testament perspective of limited retaliation to nonretaliation and active love (e.g. Romans 12, I John 4, Luke 6:27-36). In Jesus' teaching, life belongs to God. It is not ours to take. We also have to repudiate capital punishment because it is incompatible with the basic focus of the Gospel -- reconciliation and redemption. The question is clear: Do we believe in the possibility of repentance, conversion and human redemption? Can we ever take away that possibility? And if it has occurred, what a shame to take the life! Christ's concern is redemptive, and he provided us a model by giving himself for his enemies. We must give the opportunity for redemption to every sinner, without exception -- even for a murderer who did not do that for his or her victim. Jesus did not die for some sinners. He died for all. Unless we believe that every person, whether murderer or not, is redeemable and must have the chance to be redeemed, there is no real gospel. To deprive a person of the possibility of reconciliation to God and humanity -- or to end the life of someone who has received that possibility -- is the real tragedy of capital punishment. Is the biblical perspective relevant to the state? Christ's rejection of vengeance and his focus on nonretaliation seem clear on a personal level. But does this apply to the state? Does the Christian have anything to say to the secular world? The New Testament recognizes that human behavior in the world at large will not meet kingdom standards. It acknowledges a role for the state in maintaining order and does not assume that Christian standards will necessarily govern this realm (Romans 13, I Peter 2). The New Testament also implies, however, that the state has a specific function to perform and that it may exceed or violate its authority. The Bible notes that God's law is above all others and implies that there are responsible and irresponsible, useful and useless, ways to use the power that God allows the state (Romans 13, I Peter 2, Revelation 13). Christians have a responsibility to be a ferment, to be prophets. This includes calling the state to higher standards of behavior. Christ's ministry recognizes that his teaching has relevance to the larger world. Jesus was called Lord and King, and these were political names; his life and his cross were related to political issues of his day. When confronted with the woman accused of a capital crime, he made no distinction between civil and religious authority. He applied to that civil offense his own authority to forgive sins. And he suggested that no one -- civil or otherwise -- had the right to condemn her. The world is not immune to Christian moral influence, especially in a democratic society where citizens have some participation and Christian church members dominate. The Christian, therefore, has a responsibility to call the state to higher standards of behavior and to ask the state to perform its task effectively and justly. Christians must call upon the state to consider the needs of both victims and offenders, to leave room for reconciliation and forgiveness to happen, and to limit the use of force. They must challenge the state to use its power appropriately, as God intended. The biblical perspective on the death penalty clearly has relevance to our society, leaving us with a series of critical questions: If the death penalty does not actually further the effort to maintain order, if it may actually interfere, is the state using its authority appropriately? When the state punishes arbitrarily and discriminatorily, especially with a penalty so final, is it carrying out its God-given role? When the state takes a life, is it performing a function that belongs to God? No logic shows that the death penalty is a necessary response to crime. No clear evidence supports any of the rationales given for the death penalty. Justifications for the death penalty are primarily moral, emotional and symbolic. Support for the death penalty may be a way of expressing our concerns about crime and order more than a reasoned conclusion. It may also reflect a lack of options or information about those options. Since the late 1960s, polls in the United States and Canada have shown public support for the death penalty by a majority of more than two to one. In at least one of these polls, most supporters of the death penalty said that they supported it because they believed capital punishment deters crime. But over half of those who do would still support the penalty even if it were not more effective than prison sentences in deterring crime. Yet polls also suggest that the public would prefer other alternatives that provide safety and restitution when these options are offered and when information about each option is provided. In a 1993 national study, for example, public support for the death penalty dropped from 77% to 41% when such options were given. At the heart of the death penalty debate are three questions: 1. Does the state have the right to take a life for a life? 2. Does the death penalty enhance or demean the value of life? 3. Is the death penalty a necessary way to express society's moral condemnation of murder? The first question is a moral one, not directly susceptible to scientific scrutiny. Sound evidence does cast doubt upon the state's ability to take life fairly and equally. Given its concern for equal application of justice and for the sacredness of human life, the biblical perspective raises real questions about this right. The second question also is fundamentally moral, but empirical evidence lends support to the likelihood that the death penalty communicates the wrong message. The message of capital punishment is that life is expendable, that life ceases to be sacred whenever someone with the power to take it away decides there is good reason to do so. By using capital punishment we say that violence justifies violence. The third question is an important one. Society must express its deep moral revulsion for murder; we must say firmly and clearly that murder is wrong. But do executions in fact do that effectively? Are there not more constructive alternatives for communicating that message? When the state kills as a response to killing, does it not adopt and reinforce the killer's values? For Christians, there is still another fundamental question: Do we believe in the possibility of repentance and forgiveness? And if we do, can we ever take away that possibility? We can choose death for offenders. If we do we must be prepared to kill some by mistake, others arbitrarily, and all at very high cost, without making society any safer. At best, we give ourselves a false sense of security. At worst, we increase insecurity by demeaning the value of life. And if we make this choice, we will be numbered among the minority of nations -- most of them authoritarian regimes -- that retain an active death penalty. Or we can choose life. Even imprisonment for life is a choice in favor of the sanctity of life. In addition there may be other more redemptive possibilities for some. We can focus exclusively on punitive sanctions. Or we can seek to build alternatives that make room for restitution and compensation, leaving opportunity for redemption and healing. We can seek to provide a justice that is restorative. We can choose to continue our exclusive focus on the fate of offenders. Or we can choose to remember victims. We can seek alternatives that take their needs into account. We can find ways to minister to victims personally and in our churches. We can show that to be anti-death penalty does not mean to be anti-victim, that in fact it can and should mean being pro-victim. We can choose to retain our preoccupation with questions of individual guilt and punishment. Or we can widen our vision to examine the causes and meaning of violence. That must include an understanding of the distortions caused by poverty and disadvantage. We must be sensitive to the mixed messages given by a society that legitimizes violence in some situations but condemns violence in other situations. We can choose to understand violence and seek to develop a just and equitable society that has less need for violence. Perhaps the real tragedy of the debate about the death penalty is that it has sidetracked us from the real issues: the causes of violence and its meaning for both victim and offender. The answers are not easy, but they are ones we must explore. Before we can find these answers, however, we need to reach within ourselves. We must realize that each of us has suffered, that we are all in some sense victims and that suffering is not beyond our experience. But we also need to find those roots of violence and injustice that are in us all. We need to acknowledge our own complicity and failure, that we have all sinned and fallen short of what we could and should be. We are all offenders and all victims. We all need redemption. Only a foundation in that realization will allow us to build a future where violence will be unnecessary. Bibliography: Bohm, Robert M. The Death Penalty in America: Current research. Anderson Publishing, 1991. Bedau, Hugo Adam. The Death Penalty in America: Current controversies. Oxford UP, 1987. Geimer, William S. and Jonathan Amsterdam. "Why Jurors Vote Life or Death: Operative factors in ten Florida death penalty cases." American Journal of Criminal Law. 15 (1987-88): 1-54. Gray, Ian, and Moira Stanley. A Punishment in Search of a Crime. Avon Books, 1989. Hanks, Gardner. Against the Death Penalty: Christian and secular arguments against capital punishment. Herald Press, 1997. Hood, Roger. The Death Penalty: A world-wide perspective. Oxford UP, 1996. Jackson, Jesse. Legal Lynching. Publishing Group West, 1996. Marquart, James W., and Jonathan R. Sorensen. "A National Study for the Furman-Commuted Inmates: Assessing the threat to society from capital offenders." Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review. 23 (1989): pp. 5-28. Marquart, James W., Sheldon Ekland-Oakland and Johathan R. Sorensen. The Rope, the Chair, and the Needle. University of Texas Press, 1994. Masur, Louis P. Rites of Execution: Capital punishment and the transformation of American culture, 1976-1865. Oxford UP, 1989. McGivern, James J. The Death Penalty: An historical and theological survey. Paulist Press, 1997. Paternoster, Ray. Capital Punishment in America. Lexington Books, 1991. Prejean, Helen. Dead Man Walking: An eyewitness account of the death penalty in the United States. Random House, 1993. Stassen, Glenn, ed. Capital Punishment: A reader. Pilgrims Press, 1997. Streib, Victor. Death Penalty for Juveniles. Indiana UP, 1987. Tabak, Ronald J., and Mark Lane. "The Execution of Injustice: Cost and lack-of-benefit analysis of the death penalty." Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review. 23 (1989): 59-146. von Drehle, David. Among the Lowest of the Dead. Times Books, 1995. Wright, Julian H., Jr. "Life-Without-Parole: An alternative to death or not much of a life at all?" Vanderbilt Law Review. 43 (1990): 529-68. Zimring, Franklin E., and Gordon Hawkins. Capital Punishment and the American Agenda. Cambridge UP, 1986. Death Row Abu-Jamal, Mumia. Live from Death Row. Addison-Wesley, 1995. Dicks, Shirley. Death Row: Interviews with inmates, their families and opponents of capital punishment. McFarland & Co., 1990. Johnson, Robert. Death Work: A study of the modern execution process. Brooks/Cole Publishing, 1990. Miller, Kent, and Betty Davis. To Kill and Be Killed: Case studies from Florida's death row. Hope Publishing House, 1989. Restorative Justice Boers, Arthur. Justice the Heals: A biblical vision for victims and offenders. Faith and Life Press, 1992. McCold, Paul. Restorative Justice: An annotated bibliography. Criminal Justice Press, 1997. Van Ness, Dan, and Karen Heetderks Strong. Restoring Justice. Anderson Publishing, 1997. Zehr, Howard. Changing Lenses: A new focus on crime and justice. Herald Press, 1995. Victims Berger, Vivian. "Pain and Suffering -- A personal reflection and a victim-centered critique." Florida State University Law Review. 20 (1992): 21-65. Derksen, Wilma. Have You Seen Candace? Living Books, 1991. Gartner, Rosemary. "The Victims of Homicide: A temporal and cross-national comparison." American Sociological Review. 55 (1990): 92-106. Herman, Judith Lewis. Trauma and Recovery: The aftermath of violence -- from domestic abuse to political terror. Basic Books, 1992. Ogawa, Brian. Color of Justice: Culturally sensitive treatment of minority crime victims. Office of Criminal Justice Planning, 1990. Spungen, Deborah. And I Don't Want to Live this Life. Fawcett Crest, 1983. Zehr, Howard. "Who is my Neighbor? Learning to care for victims of crime." Mennonite Central Committee. Biblical Perspective Gross, Bob. The Death Penalty: A guide for Christians. FaithQuest, 1991. House, H. Wayne, and John Howard Yoder. The Death Penalty Debate: Two opposing views of capital punishment. Word, 1991. National Interreligious Task Force on Criminal Justice. Capital Punishment: What the religious community says. NITFCJ (475 Riverside Dr., Room 1700-A, New York, NY, 10027). Redekop, Vernon W. A Life for a Life? The death penalty on trial. Herald Press, 1990. Wright, Juilian H., Jr. "Pardon in the Hebrew Bible and Modern Law." Regent University Law Review. 3 (1993): 1-41. Prevention and Deterrence Cochran, John K., Mitchell B. Chamlin and Mark Seth. "Deterrence or Brutalization? An impact assessment of Oklahoma's return to capital punishment." Criminology. 32 (1994): 107-34. Peterson, Ruth D., and William C. Bailey. "Felony Murder and Capital Punishment: An examination of the deterrence question." Criminology. 29 (1991): 367-95. Radelet, Michael L., and Ron L. Akers. "Deterrence and the Death Penalty: The views of the experts." 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Organizations Amnesty International USA 322 8th Avenue, New York, NY 10001 phone: 212-807-8500 e-mail: aidp@igc.apc.org Death Penalty Information Center 1320 18th St. NW, 5th Floor, Washington, DC 20036 phone: 202-293-6970 e-mail: dpic@essential.org Internet: www.essential.org/dpic Death Row Support Project PO Box 600, Liberty Mills, IN 46946 phone: 219-982-7480 e-mail: Bgross@igc.org Equal Justice USA Quixote Center, PO Box 5206, Hyattsville, MD 20782 phone: 301-699-0042 e-mail: Quixote@igc.apc.org Internet: www.igc.apc.org/quixote/ej Murder Victims Families for Reconciliation PO Box 208, Atlantic, VA 23303 phone: 757-824-0948 e-mail: mvfrab@shore.intercom.net NAACP Legal Defense Fund 4805 Mt. Hope Dr., Baltimore, MD 21215 phone: 800-622-2755 National Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty 1436 U St. NW, Suite 104, Washington DC 20009 phone: 202-387-3890 e-mail: infor@ncadp.org or shawkins@ncadp.org Internet: www.ncadp.org Word Count: 6957
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