ith the 6 years previously required for free agency), with a right of first refusal by the players current club. For players with fewer than 4 years of service, a rising scale of minimum salaries was proposed, with the actual minimum amounts to be negotiated later on. Players licensing revenue (about $80,000 per player) would have to be split with the owners. Depending on the average obligation to the players under the 50-50 split of total revenues, no team could have a payroll of more than 110 percent of that average or less than 84 percent (Dolan 33).To the players, the owners proposal had several shortcomings. The players share of 50 percent of revenues would be a cut from the existing share of 56 percent. In addition, the players did not want to share their licensing revenue, and the loss of salary arbitration would remove a major impetus to higher player salaries. Although free agency would be liberalized, it came with the catch that the current club could retain a player by matching the offer of a club seeking a free agent. Another drawback was that the players pensions, health overage, and other benefits would be funded out of their own 50-percent share of revenues (Atlantic Unbound).The unions executive director, Donald Fehr, estimated that the owners proposal would cost the players over $1.5 billion in salary over the 7-year life of the contract. On June 18, the union predictably rejected the salary cap and other major aspects of the proposal. The union then proposed lowering the standard for qualifying for salary arbitration to 2 years, raising minimum salaries to $175,000 and, even eventually $200,000 (Monthly Labor Review). With the union dismissing the owners proposals, it was not surprising a few days later when the owners rejected the unions offer. No bargaining had even really taken place. The real purpose of the negotiators (Richard Ravitch and Donald Fehr) was to get their positions before the print and the...
