tic Unbound).Meanwhile, attention had shifted to other avenues of breaking in the deadlock. Ravitch resigned as negotiator. The owners indicated that they would use replacement players if the strike was not resolved by the start of the 1995 season. Baltimore owner Peter Angelos shocked everyone by announcing that he would not use replacement players. Also complicating the owners resolution was a law in Ontario that prevented employers such as the Toronto club from using replacement workers. Like Angelos, Detroit manager Sparky Anderson stated that he would not work with the replacement players.Frustrated by Userys ineffective mediation, President Clinton tried to turn up the heat by calling the negotiators to the White House and indicating that if a settlement was not reached by February 7, 1995, he would ask Usery to make his own recommendations for the settlement. Such recommendations would not be binding, but the President implied that they would be sent to Congress for legislative action or used as a basis for arbitration (Layden 58).Congress, however, was not receptive to the idea of a legislative settlement. House Speaker Newt Gingrich stated, Im not sure Congress is the right place to try to organize the national pastime. Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole said, Were very reluctant to get involved. Thus, Userys proposed settlement and the Presidents bill got nowhere. Neither did the idea of arbitration, because the parties would not mutually agree to allow an arbitrator to decide their fate in such an elaborate and complex matter (Atlantic Unbound).A more likely possibility was the reversal of baseballs exemption from the antitrust laws. Although this would not necessarily end the strike, it would pressure the owners to make compromises out of fear of antitrust litigation. A bill was proposed that would allow players to sue the owners if they unilaterally implemented work rules, but it would not have affected other as...
