ssbilities in dealing with this issue. It can decide to unilaterally seize control of these islands with force. But this would obviously alarm ASEAN since several claimants are members of it. Most likely, Beijing would end up isolated diplomatically from at least the rest of Asia if not the world. China could also decide to back down and make concessions on the issue. But this would result in a show of weakness and would have negative implications in China's other territorial disputes. The last option China has is to 'shelve' the issue, to put it off until a later date. This is the option Chinese leaders have pursued. In addition, China has proposed that 'joint explorations" be conducted (Roy p. 190 and F. Wang p. 37) on the Spratly Islands. Beijing has insisted upon keeping the status quo in this issue because it has little to gain from pressing the issue. Although the outcome of the Taiwan issue is more important than the outcome of the South China Seas dispute, China also seeks to maintain the status quo there. The outcome in Taiwan is more important because (F. Wang p. 36) it represents the Party's legitimacy and ability to restore rule 'over all rightful Chinese territory' (Roy p. 196) and a declaration of independence by Taiwan would destroy this hope, with 'shattering ramifications for the self-image of the Party and of China as a whole' (Roy p. 196). Essentially, the policy towards Taiwan has been: 'reunification is desirable, temporary separation is tolerable, but Taiwanese independence is unacceptable' (Roy p. 196). Military action is a very real possibility if independence is declared even if it means openly opposing American forces (F. Wang p. 36). The current 'temporary' separation does not prevent China from modernizing and since development is the short-term goal (and the consequences of independence are too staggering to b...
