acks and enquiries. In particular the decision on that day to use only the computer generated resource allocations (which were proven to be less than 100% reliable) was a high-risk move."In a report by Simpson (1994) she claimed that the software for the system was written in Visual Basic and was run in a Windows operating system. This decision itself was a fundamental flaw in the design. "The result was an interface that was so slow in operation that users attempted to speed up the system by opening every application they would need at the start of their shift, and then using the Windows multi-tasking environment to move between them as required. This highly memory-intensive method of working would have had the effect of reducing system performance still further."The system was never tested properly and nor was their any feedback gathered from the operators before hand. The report refers to the software as being incomplete and unstable, with the back up system being totally untested. The report does say that there was "functional and maximum load testing" throughout the project. However it raised doubts over the "completeness and quality of the systems testing". It also questions the suitability of the operating system chosen.This along with the poor staff training was identified to be the main root of the problem. The management staff was highly criticised in the report for their part in the organisation of staff training. The ambulance crew and the central control crew staff were, among other things, trained in separate rooms, which did not lead to a proper working relationship between the pair. Here is what the report said about staff training:"Much of the training was carried out well in advance of the originally planned implementation date and hence there was a significant "skills decay" between then and when staff were eventually required to use the system. There was also doubts over the quality of training provided, whether by S...