. .the Russians cannot avoid a decision as they did in 1812. Modern armed forces of one hundred divisions cannot abandon their sources of supply. It is anticipated that the Russian Army will stand to do battle in a defensive position protecting Great Russia and the Eastern Ukraine" (Lucas, 1998, 6).
That statement, along with being boring, is also vain. Lucas makes the assumption that everyone reading it will "know" that the 1812 decision refers to Bonaparte, and the Russian scorched earth policy. This is on page six of the book, and the novice reader is still trying to get the tactical bearings, and he begins with negating strategy. Of course, Lucas is said to not be writing a military history, but a biography of the war, from the point of view, we assume, of the little guy.
The book is divided into topical chapters rather than any linear development. We begin with "Operation Barbarossa" and then are invited to meet the German Army. Other chapters feature different topics such as "The Red Army of Workers and Peasants" (Chapter 6, pp. 44-51) and then we are given "Two German Views of the Red Army" (Chapter 7, pp. 51-55). Curiously, this approach tends to ignore the fact (seemingly obvious fact) that the Germans were the invading Army, and that the Red Army of peasants was fighting to defend the homeland.