In March and April 1954, Eisenhower seriously considered the possibility of American military intervention in Indochina. He decided against such action on grounds which proved to be sound militarily and politically, but in the process, he was forced to cope with considerable disarray and conflict within his administration, with the Congress and important allies abroad. The French, who had already suffered grievous casualties (more than 150,000) during their eight year war in Indochina, lacked both the political will and the means to save their besieged garrison at Dien Bien Phu. They urgently requested American assistance to salvage the situation. Much is still not known about the inner deliberations of the administration during this crisis. Greenstein said in 1982: "most of the primary sources bearing on United States response to the collapse of the French effort in Indo-China . . . remains classified." Ambrose stated that the elaborate process of consultation Eisenhower went through after the first week of April was "for the record and to protect himself against right-wing assaults." Halberstam referred to American diplomacy between early April and the fall of Dien Bien Phu in early May as "an elaborate shadow dance." Eisenhower took a number of steps to shore up the French position in Indochina. In July 1953, the new French government headed by Premier Joseph Laniel requested (in effect as a condition for French acceptance of the European Defence Community) $400 million in additional aid for Indochina. In late September Eisenhower extended them an additional $385 million, which paid for an aircraft carrier, 25 C-47 transport planes and helicopters. In January 1954, he added to the American aid package ten B-26 bombers and 200 American Air Force technicians to maintain them. Eisenhower did so, even though he had serious doubts concerning the soundness of French military strategy, in order, he said, "to give the French better air support and greater flexi |
