A Marxian perspective would see this as inevitable, for the war was a policy directed at a tiny country on the other side of the globe and was a war that benefited only the wealthiest Americans, while it was the sons of the poorest Americans who were being sent to fight the war. This was a criticism that would be leveled at the Nixon Administration to follow.
O'Brien, Tim. If I Die in a Combat Zone. New York: Laurel, 1973.
Ambrose, Stephen E. Nixon: The Triumph of a Politician 1962-1972. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1989.
During the 1968 campaign, Nixon had been vague about ending the war and never did spell out his plan in any detailed way, though he did pledge to end the war. Nixon had a long-standing public record as an avowed anti-Communist. During Johnson's presidency, Nixon was an avid hawk on Vietnam, often criticizing Johnson's policies while defending the waging of the war itself, a war he said had to be fought to prevent World War III. Nixon favored a military victory, but by 1968 he was being advised that military victory was impossible. The war was also increasingly unpopular with the public, causing Nixon to tone down his militancy in campaign rhetoric. He pledged to end the war without saying how he would do it. Evans and Novak find that in addition, Nixon lacked detailed planning of any kind for foreign policy: "He possessed a strong, well-defined global strategy but few of the tactics to pursue it" (Evans and Novak, Nixon in the White House 77).
In the foreign policy area, the War in Vietnam was the major problem during the Johnson administration, and this issue stood between the United States and the Soviet Union as a rationale for continuing conflict. In December 1964, Johnson referred to the sate of the world and found reason for hope everywhere except in Vietnam. He even referred to improved relations with the Soviet Union, noting that these relations were less antagonistic than at any time since World War II: