relations its own national values and experience often led to an

American failure to back up its words with action and a foreign

policy which was based on impractical idealism rather than upon

a realistic appreciation of American long term strategic

interests. He pointed out that the Anglo-Saxon democracies were

prone to moralistic passions. He likened an aroused democracy in

wartime to "those prehistoric monsters with a body as long as

this room and a brain the size of a pin."3 He was particularly

critical of Woodorw Wilson's overstated war aims in 1917-1918, a

"war to make the world safe for democracy." He placed upon

Wilson a large share of the blame for the failure of the Allies

to achieve a peace "with a minimum prejudice to the stability of

the [European] Continent,"4 which he believed stemmed from

Wilson's misguided faith in the efficacy of moral suasion and

Kissinger "emphasized the importance of 'furthering

America's interests in a world where power remains the

ultimate arbiter.'"5 He opposed the efforts of President

Nixon's UN Ambassadors to expand the peacekeeping role of the

United Nations which Kissinger viewed as a useful adjunct to

American foreign policy but not as a substitute for a cold-

(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), 93.

Taylor, A. J. P. The Origins of the Second World War. New York:

Schuster, 1992), 659 quoting from a 1975 speech by Kissinger on

our interests and leadership to the United Nations."16 The

comments that "Kissinger's realpolitik was ill-suited to an open