. . moral institutions are carcasses without personal morality, and personal morality apart from moral institutions is an unreality, a soul without a body (Bradley 114).
The moral individual must be willing to identify personal morality with the morality of the community, or state. Key to that is finding one's "station" in the community, where one may "realize" one's moral self (117). One's station "teaches us to identify others and ourselves with the station we fill; to consider that as good, and by virtue of that to consider others and ourselves good too" (117). He (!) who can take his place in the world "ought not to be discontented" (117).
Bradley quotes Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind to the effect that the "realm of morality is nothing but the absolute spiritual unity of the essence of individuals, which exists in the independent reality of them" (120). For Bradley, the "true account of the state" is nothing else than "the moral organism, the real identity of might and right," which has the ability and option to "refute every other doctrine, and do with moral approval of all what the explicit theory of scarcely one will morally justify" (119).
This could be interpreted as an articulation of communitarian values wherein disinterested public service drives the engagement of social beings who make up the community. Now Bradley's community (or state) is presumed to be