Hennessy recalled that Anglo-American frictions in 1949 included negative British reaction to the recent devaluation of the pound and a negative American reaction over British reluctance to forge closer economic and political bonds with countries on the European continent. The war in the Gulf re-forged U.S.-British bonds that had been strained by recent events:
Ironically, this new prosperity came at the price of a certain level of rearmament. Of course, Japan could not have filled U.S. procurement needs if it had not previously rebuilt its economic capacity. The economic recovery and political transformation of Japan during the U.S. occupation was the end of a long process under the paternalistic care of General Douglas MacArthur. The institutions of the defeated country, which had just endured the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the first atom bombs, were reshaped according to American democratic ideas.
Knowlton, C., & Rapoport, C. (1991, March 11). Germany & Japan: Missing in action. Fortune, 57-58.
In his own recollections of the Korean War, Theodore Cohen, then an official in the U.S. occupation, recalls a budget mission to the U.S. Pentagon to submit Japanese aid requirements for 1951-52:
Harries, M., & Harries, S. (1987). Sheathing the sword: The demilitarization of postwar Japan. New York: Macmillan. Hennessy, P. (1993). Never again: Britain 1945-51. New York: Pantheon.
Occasional reports of right-wing resurgence in Japan raise international hackles, but after 50 years a deep urge to avoid militarism appears to be ingrained in the Japanese themselves. One observer, writing in 1992, notes that avoidance surrounds even Japan's limited military role. For example, Japanese military reviews are conducted privately. Soldiers avoid appearing in their uniforms in public. Japanese military school graduates are not required to stay in the service, and many drop out. The ability to maintain the level of military recruits as the population ag