International Organization, Spring 1994, 48(2), 313-344. Essential Reading in World Politics. New York: W.W. A fifth weakness identified within neoliberal institutionalism is the assertion that states often fail to keep their promise and thus to resolve the prisoner's dilemma. What realism offers in contrast is that states have many goals in mixed interest interactions. Neoliberal institutionalists believe that the goal and statist actor is to achieve the greatest possible individual gain. If states are not basically atomistic actors, they are likely to recognize that there are very real limits to their ability to cheat when playing such games as the prisoner's dilemma. States act not only in their own best, but also in the best interests of their allies. They seek compliance and relative achievement of gains and uses to which gaps favoring partners may be employed. They are concerned about their partners' compliance with their agenda and with their partners' relative gains. In other words, realist rather than neoliberal institutionalist theory recognizes that states have sensitivity to the needs of their partners and a willingness to sacrifice somewhat on behalf of partners. nificant than markets. In realist theories, states are seen as primary actors who are able to move political and economic events forward. What neoliberal institutionalism brings to the table is the recognition that in a globalized economy, states are not necessarily as powerful or as omnipotent as they once may have been. Other organizations, including both private sector, for-profit multinational companies and nongovernmental organizations with a stake in development, play a more significant role in determining the geopolitical agenda than do states. This feature of neoliberal institutionalism provides the theory with a lens that can be used to explore the decline of state influence over the global economy. This is nowhere more evident than in the case of the Unite |