Rorty says that Antipodeans could use language such as "It looked like an elephant"; however, he makes that point in order to drive home a more compelling point about what is fundamental to Antipodean consciousness. When he equates the phrase just cited with "I had G-412 together with F-11" and characterizes it as an example of an "offhand reference," he is saying that notions of, desires for, and beliefs about observable phenomena in Antipodean formulation are taken to "caus[e] certain neural processes" (269).
In effect, Rorty is articulating the Antipodean experience of reality as a metaphysics of neuroscience. Equally, all being, not just the thinking organism's experience of being, is formulated in neurophysical terms. This is an ontology in which all living beings are neurophysical organisms. In Terran terms, the Antipodean cosmology could be said to perceive the found universe fundamentally as an object that causes organismic neural states. The reason that this is problematic for Terran philosophical discourse is that it is difficult not to conclude from Antipodean language that reported Antipodean neural processes become coeval with explained neural processes. These processes are opaque to formulations that achieve significance because they lack materiality. They are not opaque to formulations that distinguish between appearance and reality as far as the objects of an organism's neural processing is concerned, as the understanding