enforce discipline and obedience--and try to keep the North Korean society insulated from foreign ideas and cultures. Economically, however, the regime would continue to search for low-risk ways to increase productivity and improve the standard of living. That will require a reshuffling of priorities, with more resources being allocated to economic development and away from military expenditures. Yet, as long as Kim Jong Il feels insecure in the near term, his dependence on the military will continue undiminished. The KPA is bound to retain dominant influence over the North's domestic, inter-Korean, and foreign policy issue areas. And Pyongyang is likely to continue to view the military as its only leverage with Washington and Seoul. The dilemma for Kim Jong Il will be how to balance these two conflicting priorities. The status quo would have other consequences. Under the cloud of international suspicions about its nuclear intentions, Pyongyang will likely remain isolated and feel its security threatened, and may have trouble appearing credible in making any overtures to Seoul, Washington, and Tokyo. 24 Nor will the status quo solve Pyongyang's endemic shortages of daily necessities. REFORMThis scenario assumes a moderation in Pyongyang's current pattern of economic, inter-Korean, and foreign policy approaches, since Pyongyang's trustworthiness as a partner for foreign investment and trade will be pivotal to reform. Probably the most plausible scenario of this type is a gradual, modest reform. In the near term, a major structural reform would appear ruled out in order to protect the myth of Kim Il Sung's "brilliant leadership." There are two qualifications. A substantive reform (along with wrenching pains of uncertain transition) will come as a last resort if the political elite led by Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il become convinced that their collective survival depends on major changes. Another scenario for a comprehensive change postul...
