ates a possible coup by a counter elite made up of reformist generals and technocrats. Near-term reform can be essentially an extension of the current effort to increase output of consumer goods, promote tourism, provide some monetary incentives to workers and farmers, and attract South Korean and Western investment and technology. Although these steps fall short of what outsiders might call "real reforms," their success is crucial if more comprehensive reform is to occur. In any case, the future of the regime's reforms, real or otherwise, could be gauged by the following, selective indicators: A tangible shift in resource allocation in favor of nonmilitary and light industrial sectors; Economic transparency through release of comprehensive, verifiable data; Significantly increased investment in science and technology, coupled with willingness to dispatch North Korean students, scientists, and technicians to advanced countries most actively interested in North Korea's economic productivity; Relaxation of restrictions on in-country business-related travels by foreign businesspersons and technicians including South Koreans; A substantial boost in manufacturing of labor-intensive, higher-grade consumer goods for exports to South Korea and Southeast Asian countries to earn hard currency; and Rescheduling of foreign debt payments. Reform can be measured also by Pyongyang's good faith involvement in inter-Korean confidence building in both the political and military sectors. Heading the list will be new efforts to resolve the impasse over inspections of North Korea's nuclear facilities. Other steps include initiation of a regular, controlled inter-Korean family reunions; inter-Korean mail exchanges; a joint development of tourist facilities at Mount Kumgang just north of the DMZ on the east coast, or at Mount Paektu on the North Korean-Chinese border; and a reconnection of severed railroad lines. Moderation could be also largely symbolic such...
