e ownership of the means of production rather than collective ownership; A primacy of Marxist and nationalist ideological motivation over pecuniary incentives in production drives; Preferential allocation of resources for heavy industry (for arms manufacturing) and the KPA; Warlike threats against Seoul and Washington; An uncompromising attitude toward South Korea, including increased united popular front tactics against the South Korean government; and Dispatching saboteurs, guerrillas, and terrorists to the South; increasing anti-government, anti-U.S. propaganda and disinformation in South Korea; and provoking incidents along the DMZ. COLLAPSENorth Korea's problems mount to bring about its disintegration--even without external stimuli. Some analysts judge that it is not whether, but when North Korea will crumble, if Pyongyang's isolation deepens and its economy continues its slump--especially if prosperity mounts among its Asian neighbors. Several collapse possibilities can be constructed. First, collapse could occur in the event of a massive popular uprising precipitated bifworsening living conditions and internal repression. Some point to unconffrmed reports of 150,000 to 200,000 prisoners of conscience, in 12 North Korean concentration camps, as evidence of sufficiently widespread dissent to cause a massive uprising. But other analysts discount such a possibility, given Pyongyang's rigid internal control. A coup could be initiated bifmembers of the Kim Il Sung clan opposed to Kim Jong Il; or there could be a coup bifthe military, with or without support from reformist technocrats and party functionaries. An intra-family coup would be likely to succeed only with backing bifthe KPA and internal security agencies. A KPA coup, initiated bifjunior- to mid-level officers, could rally around Kim P,yong Il, half-brother to Kim Jong Il. Observers say that these officers will be concerned not so much about overhauling the North Korean system...
