as the possible disbanding of the Pyongyang-sponsored anti-South Korean political underground--the "Korean National and Democratic Front." A moderate scenario would also have implications for North Korea's foreign policy. In dealing with the United States, North Korea could drop its fixation with anti-imperialism in favor of a more pragmatic and flexible approach. The North might initiate a formal proposal to exchange semi-diplomatic "liaison offices," embark on a good faith attempt to return the remains of American MIAs, and/or be willing to participate in a possible Northeast Asian regional security dialogue. With Japan, Pyongyang could press for an early normalization of relations with Japan, even before the resolution of old pending issues. Of course, change in relations with both Washington and Tokyo will be contingent on increased efforts to resolve differences over North Korea's nuclear program. HARDLINEA hardline scenario presumes that North Korea will forgo its fledgling reform program and intensify its coercive domestic and foreign policy efforts. For decades, North Korea's domestic and foreign policy has tended to feature more hardline than moderate approaches. Its combative mind-set has not allowed much room for sustained soft approaches, which Pyongyang views as compromising and defeatist. Inured to decades of confrontation with South Korean and U.S. troops, Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il could find the notion of compromise or peaceful coexistence with Washington and Seoul unsettling and repulsive. But they might find it necessary to temper--but not abandon--their old hardline stance that sometimes worked to their advantage in dealing with Washington and Seoul. Benchmarks for a hardline scenario would include: Open defiance of international pressure regarding inspection of Pyongyang's nuclear weapons program; Intensified ideological exhortations and loyalty checks on the populace; A greater emphasis on an "all-people" or stat...
