ainst its members and protocol states, the US would meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. The protocol states were: Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam. Johnson was afraid that if he did not help South Vietnam that he would be seen as a joke all over the world. Johnson also felt that he would lose a lot of his presidential power and his legislative program for a "Great Society". Unfortunately, when Johnson took over the Presidential power the communist were starting to move slowly into South Vietnam. There was no doubt in President Johnson's mind that the United States had to help the South Vietnamese, but the question was how to help the South. In moving slowly toward direct engagement in Vietnam, President Johnson displayed a policymaking style markedly different from that of his predecessor. Whereas Kennedy had sought the views of a wide spectrum of foreign policy makers, Johnson listened principally to those who agreed with him. Johnson, "seemed to have a blind mind-set which made him pay attention to people who said that he was right."1 When Johnson was Vice President for Kennedy he felt that Americans did not need to get militarily involved in Vietnam, but when Johnson became President, Vietnam started deteriorating and he realized that he needs to do something. The Presidents prime movers were the Joint Chiefs of Staff member who felt that the US must go into combat in order to save the South. Johnson's main policy aids, Rusk, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, and National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy, were all essential figures in Johnson's decision making. All of these members came from the Kennedy administration. The first decision of Johnson came when he rejected the idea of the Joint Chiefs of Staff plan to initiate an air and ground attack against the North Vietnam. Johnson hoped that just sending support to the South would build it up and the US would not have to get involv...
