ed in combat. The deterioration of the South ruined his idea that the South would improve without combat help from the US. In 1964 shortly after the elections a US ship was attacked by North Vietnamese boats, this made Johnson ask Congress for a resolution. This resolution became known as the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which enabled the President to use military power to promote international peace and security in Southeast Asia. After countless tries to build the South, President Johnson came to embrace the assumption that South Vietnam could be saved by systematically bombing the North and committing US troops to combat in the South. At this time the Central Intelligence Agency Director, McCone was warning the President that this type of action was not going to stop the Vietcong. Johnson most of the time ignored the Central Intelligence Agency and went on with his plans. The following is a quote from the Central Intelligence Agency given to President Johnson: It is not likely that North Vietnam would (if it could) call off the war in the South although U.S. actions would in time have serious economic and political impact. Overt action against North Vietnam would be unlikely to produce reduction in Viet Cong activity sufficiently to make victory on the ground possible in South Vietnam unless accompanied by new U.S. bolstering actions in South Vietnam and considerable improvement in the government there. The most to be expected would be reduction of North Vietnamese support of the Viet Cong for a while and, thus, the gaining of some time and opportunity by the government of South Vietnam to improve itself. 2 Johnson and his policymakers felt that a build up of military troops was necessary for a military victory. In January 1965, Johnson started Operation Rolling Thunder. This was a plan to two step plan in which the United States would use the right power to get the job done. The first part was to use air power against the North...
