he precise and exact location of targets in Auschwitz. Also, the reports from Vrba and Wetzler, although informative about the horrors and atrocities of Auschwitz, did not provide detailed information that would allow for the Allies to plan a precision bombing of the camp. Neither escapee was a trained observer and could give enough information about the details of all of the building in the camp. These two pieces of information that Wyman believes provided enough information to launch an attack, Kitchens proves them to both to have great limitations to aiding the Allies. Also, Kitchens suggests that an aerial assaults on Auschwitz would not have been possible for a number of different reasons. Kitchens points out that in Wymans plan for an attack does not point out which buildings would be bombed during the aerial assault. Wyman focuses on the gas chambers at Auschwitz-Birkenau, only a section of the entire camp. He makes no mention of the main camp of Auschwitz. Kitchens includes in his article a map of Auschwitz to show exactly what buildings and areas were being left out of Wymans planKitchens then goes on to reveal a crucial piece of information that Wyman leaves out of his article and book. This is a one hundred and five page report entitled Axis Concentration Camps and Detention Camps Reported as Such in Europe which was made in October 10, 1944. This report was made by the British War Office with the highest military intelligence at the time. When examined, this report shows that the Allies really had no exact knowledge of the number of Axis extermination camps and where exactly they were located. Wyman makes no mention of this report anywhere in his writings. Near the end of his article Kitchens goes in great detail to describe how the bombing of Auschwitz would have been very difficult with the planes and military intelligence of the time. Kitchens uses specifics to name the limitations of the heavy bombers, B-25s,...
