e measures through at a cost of severe delays in creating a heavy-bomber force merely for financial and political reasons, because fighters cost less than bombers. But in reality, it was Inskips insistence on higher priority for fighter production that gave Fighter Command the tiny margin of strength by which it was able to achieve victory in 1940. Inskip deserves to be remembered as one of the true victors of the Battle of Britain.(Deighton 38). Increased production indeed helped Britains effort to prepare for war, but upon entering it, many of their planes were lost trying to save their allies from being consumed by the German wave. General Dowding, Chief of RAF Fighter Command, recognized this as a lost effort and appealed to the better senses of the Air Ministry:He put his case forward forcibly at a Cabinet meeting, illustrations with graphs that if the present rate of attrition continued for a further two weeks the RAF would not have a single Hurricane left in France or in Britain! He followed this with his now famous and courageous letter to the Under Secretary of State for Air, setting out his fears and asking for the Air Ministry to commit itself as to what it considered the level of strength needed to defend Britain. This in itself won him few friends in high places but it eventually did the trick. Shortly afterward came the order from Winston Churchill that no more fighters would leave the UK, whatever Frances need.( Franks, Norman. Battle of Britain. New York: Gallery Books, 1981. 11).Mark Donnelly summarized Britains hastened attempts to prepare for war when he wrote, In the spring and summer of 1939 Britain made preparations for a war that was increasingly unavoidable; rearmament was accelerated, air-raid shelters were built and conscription began (Donnelly 7). The British were lucky to have been as prepared as they were. Because of a few unpopular opinions that exposed the imminent threat, Britains policy of appeasement a...
