nd compromise was put to an end. Had Britain heeded warnings years before the war, the scarcity of planes would not have been a problem when Britain started to commit its planes to the defense of its allies. After committing numerous squadrons to France, Britain determined it was a lost cause. Only after Britain had lost a significant number of planes and pilots in France and as Germanys scope was set across the channel, did they realize that while invasion was plausible, control of the air and supremacy of air would determine the outcome of the Battle of Britain.It was now clear to both Britain and Germany that supremacy of the air was essential to an invasion if it were to succeed. Control of the air became paramount:On 30 June Goering issued a preliminary instruction: as long as the enemy air force is not defeated, the prime requirement is to attack itby day and by night, in the air and on the ground. It was understood that Hitler himself would give the word for the major air onslaught against Britain. But in the July weeks that followed Goering prepared to embark on a private war against the RAF over the channel. By attacking British shipping, he could force Fighter Command into a battle of attrition that must soften them up for the knockout to come. The Luftwaffe stood to win glory and to lose nothing. Hitler and his other service chiefs acquiesced passively. They too saw a battle over the channel as a cheap, useful demonstration of Germanys might. The orders were given for the overture to the Battle of Britain. (Deighton 81).Britains Royal Air Force was largely dependant on the two planes, the Hawker Hurricane and the Super Marine Spitfire. The Hurricane was equipped with heavy armor that was built to handle damage and could absorb more damage than the Spitfire but at the cost of speed and maneuvering. It flew about fifty miles per hour slower than the Spitfire and responded less accurately to controls. The Spitfire was disputabl...
