anadianmilitary force were extremely heavy. In all categories they totalled 3367 all ranks. No fewer than 1946Canadian officers and men became prisoners of war, at least 568 of them wounded. At Dieppe, from aforce of roughly 5000 men engaged for only nine hours, the Canadian Army lost more prisoners than in 4the whole eleven months of the later campaign in North-West Europe (Canada) (see figure 1). Conflicting assessments of the value of the raid continue to be presented. Some claim that it was auseless slaughter; others maintain that it was necessary to the successful invasion of the continent twoyears later on D-Day. The enemy was astonished that, inspite of a generally accurate knowledge of his defences, the Allied forces attempted an assault on an area strong both by nature and by art, withweapons which were inadequate for the task. The Allied intelligence on the whole was excellent butthere was a general lack of knowledge as to the location of regimental and battalion command posts. Other information not easily available from air reconnaissance was also lacking; notably, although theirmaps showed numerous pillboxes along the main Dieppe beach, there was no indication of theirarmament or of the presence of beach-defence or anti-tank guns. The German comments chieflyemphasized the insufficiency of the support given the assaulting infantry (Dieppe Raid). Also by thetime of Dieppe raid, accordingly, the German Army in the West had been greatly strengthened and wasin a full alert, expecting at any moment what might be major Allied enterprise. During the first half ofAugust Hitler ordered the construction of what came to be called the Atlantic Wall (Atkin, 282). Thedecision to eliminate the attack by heavy bombers, recommended in the first instance by the Air ForceCommander and concurred in the Military Force Commander, was supported by arguments of somestrength. General Roberts was told that the...
