RAF night bombers were quite incapable of hitting withaccuracy such a small target as the buildings fronting the sea at Dieppe, and the United States daybomber force in U.K. was still in its infancy (it made its first small raid two days before the Dieppeoperation). But the decision removed from the plan the one element of really heavy support containedin it. The assault as a result was backed by nothing more powerful than 4-inch guns and Bostonbombers (Villa, 126). Surprise, rather than striking power, was chief reliance in this operation; yet nosurprise could be hoped for in the frontal attack, which was to go in half an hour later than those on theflanks. As the heavy air support have been removed from the plan, heavy naval support was notsubstituted. After the operation, the Naval Force Commander reported that he was satisfied that acapital ship could have operated in the Dieppe area during the first two or three hours of the operation 5without undue risk, and would probably have turned the tide ashore in their favour. The planners alsonever asked for an old battleship to provide fire support because the Admiralty policy at this periodwas opposed to risking capital ships in the narrow waters of the channel that it was considered uselessto make the request (Botting, 217). The three Force Commanders inherited a plan already made andwere concerned mainly with detail, although they shared the responsibility for the basic decision to eliminate the bomber attack. So far as any one individual had general authority over the operation, itwas the Chief of Combined Operations, Lord Louis Mountbatten; but obviously even his powers werecircumscribed. The fact is that the Dieppe plan was the work of a large and somewhat indefinitelycomposed committee, whose composition, moreover, changed steadily as the planning proceeded. Asimpler organization and a greater concentration of responsibility would have ...
