been more likely toresult in a sound plan (Robertson, 173). C.O.H.Q produced a bulky report incorporating lessonslearned which suggested that overwhelming fire power, including close support, during the initialstages of the attack was necessary; in addition for flexibility in the military plan and its execution. Finally, Dieppe killed the always dubious idea of frontal attack of a major fortified port, was hazardousin the first place (Hunter,297). In conclusion, the Dieppe raid was an ill-prepared rehearsal for the second front and in almostevery respect a failure for the Allies. While planning for the raid the Combined OperationsHeadquarters made blundering decisions of eliminating heavy bombardment both air and naval; andbriefing the plan to the force until the last possible moment also foreboded the raid to go according toplan. Firepower given to the soldiers was not adequate at all for the mission they were assigned toaccomplish against German machine-guns at terrible geographical landing. Although the planners hadsome knowledge of the German defences at Dieppe they did not have a specific view of the locationand their ammunition. Finally, the main reason for the raid to become a failure was the inefficientreporting along with ill-fortune suffered by the Allied forces which came to a great loss in the end. Dieppe is the most memorable events of the Second World War, for Canadians in particular as theirlosses amounted the most. 6...
